From Strategic Forecasting Inc:
Tactical Implications of a Border Fence
By Fred Burton
The House of Representatives has passed a measure, H.R. 4437, that calls for 698 miles of border fencing to be built in five strategic locations. Meanwhile, the Senate is considering a measure, S. 2611, that has been amended to authorize 370 miles of new fencing, which would be built over the next two years. In all likelihood, the Senate will pass a measure and the numerical differences will be worked out in a joint conference committee. Splitting the difference would mean that about 500 miles of new fencing ultimately would be built. Currently, there are only about 75 miles of existing fence along the U.S.-Mexico border -- a distance spanning some 2,000 miles.
In the U.S. Border Patrol's San Diego Sector, modern fences have been built, in several different phases, since the 1990s. Judging from Border Patrol statistics, these measures have had significant impacts; the numbers of illegal aliens apprehended and amounts of narcotics seized in the San Diego sector have plummeted dramatically since fencing was built. However, fences are effective only in the areas where they exist. The San Diego fence has not impacted the total number of people who enter the United States illegally, but only the number entering illegally in a certain area.
As statistics for other border sectors indicate, the net result over time has been to redirect the flow of illegal traffic. This is a logical outcome; illegal immigration is a complex, nuanced issue that stems from economic and social conditions on both sides of the border, and partial measures can be expected to yield limited results. When it comes to fencing, however, the only measures that can be seriously debated or attempted are, by definition, partial. There have been no calls in Washington for the border to be completely walled off, nor -- given political and economic considerations and international perceptions of such a move -- would that be particularly productive.
It certainly would not be effective: Illegal aliens also have been apprehended coming in by sea and by air, not to mention at well-manned border checkpoints where they were found with legitimate immigration documents (fraudulently obtained) and sophisticated counterfeits. Thus, whatever compromises the House and Senate might be able to forge on a border fencing initiative, one can expect certain outcomes. Fencing will not stop the flow of illegal immigration, but will redirect it. And in both the areas where fencing exists and where it does not, there will be security implications that are worth examining.
Walls, Fences and Statistics
Border walls and fences have been used for thousands of years. The Athenians built "long walls," such as that running to Piraeus, as military fortifications. Chinese emperors built the Great Wall to help protect against Mongol invasion; the Romans erected Hadrian's Wall to guard settlements in what became England from marauding Picts and other tribes to the north. And the Berlin Wall was erected almost overnight -- though not so much to keep people out of the newly Soviet territory east of the wall as to keep people in.
Clearly, the United States is not concerned about Spartans, Mongol hordes or fearsome Celts, but heavy tides of illegal immigrants, criminal aliens and narcotics.The heaviest concentrations of illegal entrants and drugs traditionally have come through the Border Patrol's San Diego Sector, given the close proximity of Tijuana and San Diego; it obviously is much easier for border-crossers to hide or blend into a large city than to escape notice or find shelter in the open desert or mountain terrains farther to the east.
It was in response to these crossings that the U.S. federal government began building fences, in several phases, in the early 1990s; today, 44 of the San Diego sector's 66 miles are fenced.
Over time, fencing techniques have changed, in keeping with shifting political goals. The fencing at one time was merely a simple cable, intended to mark the location of the border and restrict vehicle traffic. Now, there are chain-link fences and even areas dominated by heavy steel structures, made from recycled metal landing mats that were used in the Vietnam War. The most modern construction techniques in border fencing began to appear in 1995, with a three-tiered design created at Sandia National Laboratory. In this design, the steel landing mat structure is the southernmost layer; a well-lit, open area separates that from a 15-foot metal mesh fence (designed to keep out pedestrians) about 50 yards to the north. A road through the open space allows for Border Patrol access, and an array of technologies -- heavy video coverage, thermal imaging and embedded sensors that detect metals, heat and movement -- blanket the area. In regions prone to heavy crossing traffic, there is a third, low fence north of the mesh structure.
Measuring the effectiveness of border controls is a complex matter. The numbers of people apprehended do not necessarily paint an accurate picture, since the problem the United States is attempting to solve, obviously, involves those who are not caught. However, Border Patrol statistics are among the few empirical measurements available, and these numbers do support the theory that fencing stops pedestrians from illegally crossing the border -- at least, in the areas where it exists.
According to the U.S. Border Patrol, there were more than 100,000 apprehensions every year along the border in the San Diego sector before the triple fence was built, but that number now has dropped to about 5,000 per year. However, these numbers pertain only to apprehensions along the southern border. The San Diego sector is a large space -- encompassing 7,000 square miles of southern California territory -- and stretches far to the north of the Mexican border. Many more people are apprehended within the entire sector -- 138,608 in fiscal 2004 -- than they are within the border zone. Nevertheless, the overall trend line shows a decline in apprehensions (which can be extrapolated as an indication of fewer illegal crossings) since the wall was built.
It is equally important to note, however, that after the completion of the fence in the mid-1990s, statistical trends moved in precisely the opposite direction at checkpoints east of the San Diego sector, where there is less fencing -- and where staffing increases for the Border Patrol have not been able to fix the problem either. The increases have been most visible in the Tucson sector.
Border Patrol agents, politicians and San Diego residents all agree that the fences have reduced the flow of illegal aliens crossing the border in those areas where they have been completed. And this has helped to fuel the current calls for more sections of fencing in high-traffic areas. It is no accident, then, that most of the Tucson sector -- another high-traffic border zone containing several significant border towns and a major metropolitan area further north -- would be fenced under the congressional measures now being considered.
Implications
Though it is not yet clear how much new fencing Congress might authorize, it is apparent from the existing proposals that much of the construction would occur in high-traffic areas along the border -- which also means near urban areas. Ultimately, we would expect the plan to force illegal crossings toward more sparsely populated areas of the border. There are several implications here.
irst, such a plan could help to take some of the heat out of the current debate on immigration, which has become a tremendous headache for the Bush administration and both parties in Congress. If illegal crossings are diverted away from urban areas and are witnessed by fewer people, it might create perceptions -- as in the San Diego area -- that flows are being reduced. Whether that is true in whole or in part, the perceptions themselves are an important consideration in an election year; constructing fences in the highest-volume areas would be a visible sign that action is being taken. And, indeed, fencing would in all likelihood reduce illegal crossings in those areas, even if the overall impact on the illegal immigration issue is minimal.
Second, building fences would increase the physical risks faced by those attempting to cross the border illegally, in at least two meaningful ways. For one thing, much of the border terrain is rugged and arid, with few natural landmarks in areas outside the cities. People easily can get lost, become dehydrated and grow disoriented. These are not new risks, but if access to major urban areas like Tucson or Laredo is blocked, the consideration becomes much more relevant from a migrant's perspective. If traveling on foot, one might be days, rather than steps, away from assistance. There is a very real chance that immigrants could die of exposure -- and indeed, human rights groups have reported that the number of illegal aliens who die while attempting the crossing has risen since the San Diego fence was built.
The increased difficulties might prompt would-be immigrants to seek the assistance of coyotes -- or alien smugglers -- instead, which entails security risks of another sort. Not only can the fees demanded by coyotes be exorbitant, but stories of abuse at the hands of smugglers are well documented. The numbers of illegal aliens who are robbed, raped or murdered during their journey might grow as traffic flows are redirected.
Either way, the calculus for those considering a border crossing will -- if not exactly shift -- take on significant new dimensions as sections of fence are built and aliens are funneled toward ever more remote and rugged terrain.
There also are implications for U.S. residents and property owners in the regions that will remain unfenced -- which include large swathes of the El Paso, Marfa and Del Rio sectors in Texas. When the fence was built in the San Diego sector, residents in the Tucson sector reported increases in trespassing and petty theft, as more illegal aliens -- some desperate for food, water and other staples -- trekked through. This pattern could be expected in other parts of the border as traffic flows shift.
Evolving Tactics
In some respects, the border fence discussion is a great example of the larger challenge posed by illegal immigration. The U.S. government builds one section of fence, and the flow diverts to other areas. The pressures that drive emigration northward from poorer countries are so strong that even if the United States was capable of sealing the land border with Mexico, other areas and means of entering would be found.
In recent decades, for example, an arms race of sorts has been raging between governments and people who counterfeit or alter legal documents used by immigrants, and it likely will accelerate if border fencing adds significantly to the challenges of entering the United States illegally by land. Counterfeiters have been aided greatly by advancements in digital technology: High-quality scanners and laser printers have become more widely available and increasingly affordable. In response, governments have adopted even more technologically advanced identity documents with enhanced security features. These measures sometimes can backfire.
For example, there was a short-lived episode involving green U.S. passports that were designed to be "technologically advanced and difficult to alter." Enterprising criminals discovered within days that they could pop the high-tech laminates off the passports, using a decidedly low-tech method, and quickly swap the photos on the document before sealing it back down. In cases where technical alteration becomes too difficult, other types of crime tick upward: Criminals steal blank birth certificates or pay others to swipe legal records for them. A few years ago in a southern state, for example, crooks paid a cleaning crew to steal all the license-making equipment and materials from a department of motor vehicles office.
In the realm of alien smuggling, as with terrorism or other crime communities, there is an evolutionary process at work. Each physical security innovation on the part of the government sparks a tactical change on the opposing side, in a self-perpetuating cycle. This has been evident also in the reaction of marijuana smugglers to the San Diego sector fence. Not only have smugglers, like illegal immigrants, headed east to get around the fence, but there also have been many attempts to burrow underneath it as well. In fact, during the past month, the San Diego Tunnel Task Force -- and it is significant that an entity with such a name should even exist -- discovered two tunnels, both rather crude, running beneath the border fence.
These tunnels, however, were dwarfed by the discovery in January of what is believed to be the longest cross-border tunnel -- also in San Diego. This Hogan's Heroes-like structure, which descended to a depth of 81 feet, featured lighting, a ventilation system and concrete floors. It stretched nearly half a mile from a building on the Mexican side to the floor of a warehouse on the U.S. side of the border. Complex tunnel systems have also been found in places like Nogales, Ariz. It is believed that tunnels like these are used mainly to smuggle drugs, but as the price for passage to the United States increases, they doubtless will be used more frequently to smuggle people across the border as well.
Successful criminals are invariably resourceful, and the issues that fuel illegal immigration to the United States are multifaceted. So long as immigration crimes remain profitable, there will be attempts to circumvent -- and reinvent -- the system.
Send questions or comments on this article to analysis@stratfor.com.
Wrap...
No comments:
Post a Comment