From The Miami Herald:
Posted on Mon, Oct. 03, 2005
Fixing responsibility for Abu Ghraib abuse
OUR OPINION: PUNISHING ONLY LOW-LEVEL SOLDIERS ISN'T ENOUGH
The conviction and sentencing of Lynndie England last week, the last of nine courts-martial of enlisted men and women for abusing detainees at Baghdad's Abu Ghraib prison, brought an unsatisfactory conclusion to the scandal. Responsibility for what happened must not end there.
Those young soldiers did not act in a vacuum. They were part of a mission bigger than themselves. They were carrying out assignments to defeat an enemy defined by military brass at the Pentagon and civilians in the White House.
When the final chapter in this scandal is written, all who had a part in it should be identified and made to own up to their responsibility -- just as happened with Lynndie England and the other foot soldiers. Private England was sentenced to three years in prison and given a dishonorable discharge from the Army. No officer or commander thus far has been tried, although several have gotten administrative punishments.
Chain of command
It doesn't take a genius to figure out that in an organization as rigidly controlled as the military, commanders bear some degree of responsibility for the actions of troops under their command. The top officers are responsible for the training, or lack thereof, supervision, discipline and guidance of troops under their command. In Iraq, military leaders on the ground decide what the specific missions are and how to achieve them, including whether to adhere to Geneva Conventions, international law or the U.S. Constitution. And the colonels and generals themselves are following orders from their civilian bosses, who define the broader goals and objectives. In this war, the civilian leadership in Washington defined the fight as a war against terrorism.
It is easy to see how all of this may have been fuzzed up with the detainees at Abu Ghraib. Are they civilians, insurgents, prisoners of war or terrorists? What are the rules applicable to their detention? At Abu Ghraib prison, soldiers were put in a confused and chaotic environment either with, (a) tacit instructions about what was expected of them or, (b) no instructions at all. In either case, they are not lone actors in what occurred.
Army Capt. Ian Fishback, 26, succinctly states the case for responsibility. He spent nearly 18 months going up the chain of command, reporting on abuses at Abu Ghraib, asking questions and trying to get answers and guidance. Frustrated with denials and avoidance, he went public with his concerns. ''We did not set the conditions for our soldiers to succeed,'' he said. ''We failed to set clear standards, communicate those standards and enforce those standards. For us to get to that point now, however, we have to come to grips with whether it's acceptable to use coercion to obtain information from detainees.'' Clearly, Capt. Fishback gets it.
Is anyone in Congress listening?
Wrap...
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