Thursday, November 23, 2006

Quiet on the homefront...

From Strategic Forecasting, Inc:

The Missing Voices in the Iraq War Debate
By Bart Mongoven

In its first symbolically significant act since the midterm elections, the Democratic Party selected Rep. Steny Hoyer (D-Md.) as House majority leader, dealing a blow to Rep. John Murtha (D-Pa.), the face of the party's anti-war faction. The decision was made with an eye on the 2008 presidential elections, and is only the latest in a long series of events that suggest the Democratic Party's long-term strategy has no clear place for the party's anti-war faction or rhetorical space for its messages.

This points to an unusual dilemma in U.S. politics, and to an even more unusual atmosphere inside the Washington beltway. Though the war in Iraq continues -- omnipresent in the media, foreign policy discussions and the calculations of other powers -- it is curiously absent as a driving force in Beltway processes and political machinery. We do not mean this, by any stretch, to imply that politicians do not discuss or think about the war, but there is a striking contrast between the atmosphere in Washington and that in the rest of the country (or at least in the media) when it comes to Iraq.

There also is a striking contrast between Washington's attitude toward this war and past wars, in which numerous federal government agencies and the business lobby all had a clear stake. As retired Gen. William McCaffrey, now a professor at West Point, has stated, "Inter-agency support for our U.S. Iraq strategy is grossly inadequate. Only the armed forces and the CIA are at war."

There are numerous reasons for this state of affairs. Some are rooted in the Democratic Party, which is attempting to reinvent itself after its long wanderings in the political wilderness. Some are rooted in the personal and political dynamics of the Republican Party and the Bush White House -- and even more significantly, in the "business as usual" mantra the administration adopted following the 9/11 attacks. In both cases, there is a clear sense that the war, though a burning priority for voters, does not intersect with the major political battles now being waged to win the presidency in 2008.

The Democrats and the War

Given the percentage of voters who, while not anti-war, are heartily displeased with the Bush administration's handling of Iraq, it is noteworthy that the Democratic Party has not publicly adopted a position that places the war issue squarely at the center of its identity. This did not pose a tremendous obstacle, of course, to winning the Nov. 7 elections. The Democrats already had the support of anti-war voters and were able to make serious incursions into the GOP support base by attracting Republicans who were disgruntled with the administration. Taking a strong anti-war stand during the election campaign would have been damaging to the Democrats: It would have attracted few additional anti-war votes and inevitably would have alienated the rebellious Republican swing voters. Therefore, saying as little as possible about the war was the wisest political strategy.

That strategy having been successful, however, Democrats are now in power and are expected to take a stand on the war. In the Murtha-Hoyer decision, their first act was to punt. There is more to the equation than this, of course. There is enough ethical baggage in Murtha's past that it would have been awkward (to say the least) for the Democrats, under his majority leadership, to push the Republicans on ethical issues. Nevertheless, the anti-war faction of the Democratic Party is not represented in the new congressional leadership. So far, Rep. Charles Rangel (D-N.Y.) has made more noise than any party leader about the war -- and his proposal to reinstate the draft is an interesting political tactic, but it is far from turning the war into a strategic issue for the party.

The deeper explanation for the party's position -- or lack of position -- on the war is complex. The civil rights, labor, environmental and other major sub-groupings that make up its traditional base are not focused on the war because the political strategies they are following do not have a place for the war or for anti-war activists. Consequently, the Democratic Party's long-term efforts to coalesce these groups around a set of core values does not center on the war -- which, again, is a polarizing issue. And that means the party has not pushed for the anti-war faction to be represented in the new congressional leadership.

The Atmospheric Backdrop

That the Republican Party and interest groups have given the Democrats a free pass on the issue is another remarkable element of the situation. For a variety of reasons, the GOP leadership is in no position to beat up Democrats as being wishy-washy -- and in so doing, exacerbate tensions over its own prosecution of the war.

The GOP's inability to capitalize on the Democrats' indecision is an immediate, tactical concern for the Republican leadership, but it also must be noted that Iraq has not been a driving feature in the larger picture either -- and that this affects the federal government at almost all levels. McCaffrey's contention -- that only the military and the CIA are at war -- speaks to an important point, and one that links up directly with the nation's "business as usual" response to the 9/11 attacks.

The president's "business as usual" strategy was a crucial psychological component to the war against jihadists. Fears of a major economic recession were prominent in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. On Sept. 10, 2001, increasing America's savings rate was a long-term goal for the administration, but at the time of the attacks, a downturn already was taking hold, and both policymakers and market-makers worried that a rapid, marked decline in personal spending would send the economy into a tailspin. From this, the administration's position on personal sacrifice -- make none -- was born.

However, it is a mindset that also has permeated the federal government and executive branch, with possibly unforeseen consequences that now have produced a political schism. Both the business and government communities were advised to go about their affairs, leaving the military and intelligence communities to worry about fighting terrorists, so as not to amplify the psychological effects of the attacks in New York and Washington, D.C. However, because Iraq has been, from the start, a war of U.S. choosing, the "business as usual" attitude shifted from a purely financial one to a political one as well.

If Iraq brought with it economic hardship -- whether through higher taxes or decreased availability of goods and services -- it would have been a political disaster for the administration. The approach to Iraq, therefore, was the same as the war against al Qaeda: People, acting as civil servants, consumers or beneficiaries of government assistance, should do nothing differently in day-to-day life, and the military would do its job. The larger expense of the war would be borne by deficit spending, and -- by the GOP's logic -- the financial deficits that followed likely would anger only the (largely captive) libertarian wing of the Republican Party.

The GOP Blocs

Within the party itself, the "business as usual" mantra has played out differently among key segments of supporters, with varying implications. Again, the differences between the Beltway perspective and mainstream public's perspective on the war are striking.

The Business Lobby

The main topics of conversation among K Street lobbyists have remained regulatory affairs, tax policy and access to markets, rather than the war. This makes Iraq an unusual study in the history of U.S. war efforts. The business community long has taken an active interest in foreign policy issues. It was active throughout the Cold War in helping the U.S. government voice the need for open markets -- a direct challenge to the closed system of the Soviet Union -- and it helped successive administrations form priorities in terms of balancing military, trade and economic concerns.

During World War II, the business sector became an adjunct to the federal government, providing whatever the government ordered for the war effort. And during Vietnam and Korea, the business lobby played a critical role in communicating the long-term financial and political implications of the war. In each of these cases, business clearly articulated its interest in the war. But since the invasion of Iraq in 2003, business has followed the lead of the executive branch. It has neither taken a clear position on the war as a group, nor lobbied for anything outside of its own narrow self-interest. As industry focused on "business as usual" -- debates over regulatory systems and tax policy -- the administration lost an opportunity to hear the viewpoint of the business establishment.

This is something that presidents in past wars were able to use to their advantage. The Bush administration lost out on this opportunity both because it did not seek the input of the business community on war issues, and because business did not move to provide that to the administration. Why that should be the case is debatable. Some would say it is because President George W. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney, though businessmen themselves, and with linkages to the Fortune 500 elite, have included few business alumni in their inner circle. Not many White House insiders -- whether political, administrative or policymaking -- come from the business community or even have worked as business lawyers.

Others argue that the business community's continued reluctance to play an overt role is the result of anti-war claims that "big business" got the United States into the war in the first place. When charges of a "war for oil" seemed to draw popular attention, it is possible that the business community chose to keep its distance -- and thus preserve the goodwill of the administration and congressional heavyweights -- rather than risk its reputation and individual brand names.

Still others point to an increasingly professional Washington lobbying establishment dominated by career politicians and their staffs. These professionals are Washington creatures, whose views of issues are colored by location and, more importantly, by the insularity of the Washington community.

The Evangelicals

The evangelical Christian right also has been relatively quiet in the debate over Iraq. Rather than providing moral guidance, attempting to offer a staunch moral justification for the war or even attempting to oppose the war effort, conservative evangelicals generally have offered quiet support for the president and, otherwise, stood aside as the decisions have been made. This is clearly the safest course for the evangelical leadership, particularly those most closely tied to the Republican Party: The religious right's commitment to the party is beginning to fray, and the chief challenge facing Republican leaders over the next two years is finding ways to keep the bulk of evangelical Christians engaged in national-level politics.

Their followers know people who are in harm's way and have deep concerns about how the war is fought. Still, evangelical leadership has remained on the sidelines. Given the power and influence that the evangelicals have built up over the past decade, their silence on the war issue comes across almost as an abdication.

The Hawks

Of the major Republican blocs, only the foreign policy hawks (primarily military and retired military personnel) have been active on war issues. For the most part, this group has been divided by allegiance to the commander-in-chief -- a president they generally like and understand -- and growing recognition that the leadership has failed in its prosecution of the war. The growing currency of the idea that the Defense Department, particularly Donald Rumsfeld, failed American troops was toxic to the Republican Party, but this lobby did not have the clear will, leadership and access to drive this point home to the administration.

Some merely left the party in November, voting Democratic as a protest; many others sat the election out.

The Schism

The sum total of all of these trends has been to produce a crucial gap between the political machinery inside the Beltway and the American public. With business and evangelicals not discussing the war at all, and the war hawks divided in sentiment, there was no one from outside the administration who could convince the president and his closest advisers that the country needed to shift course in the war -- or at the very least, that retaining Rumsfeld as defense secretary eventually would cost the GOP control of Congress.

Influential outside lobbies usually provide these points of view; on Iraq, they have been muted -- and the few who have spoken out have been ignored. The problem, of course, is that almost every average American knows someone who has been sent to Iraq or has seen the disruption that the military deployments have on the lives of these individuals and their families.

Outside the Beltway, the war is very real. The November election made it clear that voters not only are interested in the war, but were prepared to cast their ballots with Iraq at the forefront of their minds. The distance between these voters and the political leadership is remarkable. Even more remarkable, however, is the fact that none of the intermediate players who typically would have influence -- the conservative evangelicals, labor, business or mainline Protestant denominations -- have been heavily involved in the conduct of this war, and none appear anxious to change that now.

The forthcoming report of the Iraq Study Group -- the bipartisan panel commissioned by Bush to study policy options on the war -- can be expected to reawaken Beltway factions and debate, at least briefly. And the group may indeed be capable of recommending improvements over current strategy in the war. However, the silence from the idea mill in Washington -- not just the official think tanks, but also the informal gatherings of intelligent, well-informed lobbyists and government officials -- already has had a lasting impact on the nation.

Send questions or comments on this article to analysis@stratfor.com.

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