From truthout.org:
Michael Schwartz
7 Facts You Might Not Know About the Iraq War
http://www.truthout.org/docs_2006/082106M.shtml
Michael Schwartz considers some of the just-under-the-radar-screen realities of the situation in Iraq and provides a guide to understanding what is likely to be a flood of new Iraqi developments - "a few enduring, but seldom commented upon, patterns central to the dynamics of the Iraq war, as well as to the fate of the American occupation and Iraqi society."
Wrap...
Monday, August 21, 2006
Sunday, August 20, 2006
King Bush, the throwback....
From NY Times:
August 21, 2006
Op-Ed Columnist
Tax Farmers, Mercenaries and Viceroys
By PAUL KRUGMAN
Yesterday The New York Times reported that the Internal Revenue Service would outsource collection of unpaid back taxes to private debt collectors, who would receive a share of the proceeds.
It’s an awful idea. Privatizing tax collection will cost far more than hiring additional I.R.S. agents, raise less revenue and pose obvious risks of abuse. But what’s really amazing is the extent to which this plan is a retreat from modern principles of government. I used to say that conservatives want to take us back to the 1920’s, but the Bush administration seemingly wants to go back to the 16th century.
And privatized tax collection is only part of the great march backward.
In the bad old days, government was a haphazard affair. There was no bureaucracy to collect taxes, so the king subcontracted the job to private “tax farmers,” who often engaged in extortion. There was no regular army, so the king hired mercenaries, who tended to wander off and pillage the nearest village. There was no regular system of administration, so the king assigned the task to favored courtiers, who tended to be corrupt, incompetent or both.
Modern governments solved these problems by creating a professional revenue department to collect taxes, a professional officer corps to enforce military discipline, and a professional civil service. But President Bush apparently doesn’t like these innovations, preferring to govern as if he were King Louis XII.
So the tax farmers are coming back, and the mercenaries already have. There are about 20,000 armed “security contractors” in Iraq, and they have been assigned critical tasks, from guarding top officials to training the Iraqi Army.
Like the mercenaries of old, today’s corporate mercenaries have discipline problems. “They shoot people, and someone else has to deal with the aftermath,” declared a U.S. officer last year.
And armed men operating outside the military chain of command have caused at least one catastrophe. Remember the four Americans hung from a bridge? They were security contractors from Blackwater USA who blundered into Falluja — bypassing a Marine checkpoint — while the Marines were trying to pursue a methodical strategy of pacifying the city. The killing of the four, and the knee-jerk reaction of the White House — which ordered an all-out assault, then called it off as casualties mounted — may have ended the last chance of containing the insurgency.
Yet Blackwater, whose chief executive is a major contributor to the Republican Party, continues to thrive. The Department of Homeland Security sent heavily armed Blackwater employees into New Orleans immediately after Katrina.
To whom are such contractors accountable? Last week a judge threw out a jury’s $10 million verdict against Custer Battles, a private contractor that was hired, among other things, to provide security at Baghdad’s airport. Custer Battles has become a symbol of the mix of cronyism, corruption and sheer amateurishness that doomed the Iraq adventure — and the judge didn’t challenge the jury’s finding that the company engaged in blatant fraud.
But he ruled that the civil fraud suit against the company lacked a legal basis, because as far as he could tell, the Coalition Provisional Authority, which ran Iraq’s government from April 2003 to June 2004, wasn’t “an instrumentality of the U.S. government.” It wasn’t created by an act of Congress; it wasn’t a branch of the State Department or any other established agency.
So what was it? Any premodern monarch would have recognized the arrangement: in effect, the authority was a personal fief run by a viceroy answering only to the ruler. And since the fief operated outside all the usual rules of government, the viceroy was free to hire a staff of political loyalists lacking any relevant qualifications for their jobs, and to hand out duffel bags filled with $100 bills to contractors with the right connections.
Tax farmers, mercenaries and viceroys: why does the Bush administration want to run a modern superpower as if it were a 16th-century monarchy? Maybe people who’ve spent their political careers denouncing government as the root of all evil can’t grasp the idea of governing well. Or maybe it’s cynical politics: privatization provides both an opportunity to evade accountability and a vast source of patronage.
But the price is enormous. This administration has thrown away centuries of lessons about how to make government work. No wonder it has failed at everything except fearmongering.
Wrap...
August 21, 2006
Op-Ed Columnist
Tax Farmers, Mercenaries and Viceroys
By PAUL KRUGMAN
Yesterday The New York Times reported that the Internal Revenue Service would outsource collection of unpaid back taxes to private debt collectors, who would receive a share of the proceeds.
It’s an awful idea. Privatizing tax collection will cost far more than hiring additional I.R.S. agents, raise less revenue and pose obvious risks of abuse. But what’s really amazing is the extent to which this plan is a retreat from modern principles of government. I used to say that conservatives want to take us back to the 1920’s, but the Bush administration seemingly wants to go back to the 16th century.
And privatized tax collection is only part of the great march backward.
In the bad old days, government was a haphazard affair. There was no bureaucracy to collect taxes, so the king subcontracted the job to private “tax farmers,” who often engaged in extortion. There was no regular army, so the king hired mercenaries, who tended to wander off and pillage the nearest village. There was no regular system of administration, so the king assigned the task to favored courtiers, who tended to be corrupt, incompetent or both.
Modern governments solved these problems by creating a professional revenue department to collect taxes, a professional officer corps to enforce military discipline, and a professional civil service. But President Bush apparently doesn’t like these innovations, preferring to govern as if he were King Louis XII.
So the tax farmers are coming back, and the mercenaries already have. There are about 20,000 armed “security contractors” in Iraq, and they have been assigned critical tasks, from guarding top officials to training the Iraqi Army.
Like the mercenaries of old, today’s corporate mercenaries have discipline problems. “They shoot people, and someone else has to deal with the aftermath,” declared a U.S. officer last year.
And armed men operating outside the military chain of command have caused at least one catastrophe. Remember the four Americans hung from a bridge? They were security contractors from Blackwater USA who blundered into Falluja — bypassing a Marine checkpoint — while the Marines were trying to pursue a methodical strategy of pacifying the city. The killing of the four, and the knee-jerk reaction of the White House — which ordered an all-out assault, then called it off as casualties mounted — may have ended the last chance of containing the insurgency.
Yet Blackwater, whose chief executive is a major contributor to the Republican Party, continues to thrive. The Department of Homeland Security sent heavily armed Blackwater employees into New Orleans immediately after Katrina.
To whom are such contractors accountable? Last week a judge threw out a jury’s $10 million verdict against Custer Battles, a private contractor that was hired, among other things, to provide security at Baghdad’s airport. Custer Battles has become a symbol of the mix of cronyism, corruption and sheer amateurishness that doomed the Iraq adventure — and the judge didn’t challenge the jury’s finding that the company engaged in blatant fraud.
But he ruled that the civil fraud suit against the company lacked a legal basis, because as far as he could tell, the Coalition Provisional Authority, which ran Iraq’s government from April 2003 to June 2004, wasn’t “an instrumentality of the U.S. government.” It wasn’t created by an act of Congress; it wasn’t a branch of the State Department or any other established agency.
So what was it? Any premodern monarch would have recognized the arrangement: in effect, the authority was a personal fief run by a viceroy answering only to the ruler. And since the fief operated outside all the usual rules of government, the viceroy was free to hire a staff of political loyalists lacking any relevant qualifications for their jobs, and to hand out duffel bags filled with $100 bills to contractors with the right connections.
Tax farmers, mercenaries and viceroys: why does the Bush administration want to run a modern superpower as if it were a 16th-century monarchy? Maybe people who’ve spent their political careers denouncing government as the root of all evil can’t grasp the idea of governing well. Or maybe it’s cynical politics: privatization provides both an opportunity to evade accountability and a vast source of patronage.
But the price is enormous. This administration has thrown away centuries of lessons about how to make government work. No wonder it has failed at everything except fearmongering.
Wrap...
Saturday, August 19, 2006
I hate these bastards...
From WayneMadsenReports.com :
Aug. 19/20, 2006 -- Additional clues point to U.S. attack on Iran.
State Department sources report that State's Iran Desk Officer Henry Wooster has suddenly been transferred to another position. Meanwhile, Vice President Dick Cheney's office is assembling a group of neo-cons from the Pentagon, State Department, and the National Security Council to cook up intelligence and talking points that will show Iran to be an imminent nuclear threat.
Wrap...
Aug. 19/20, 2006 -- Additional clues point to U.S. attack on Iran.
State Department sources report that State's Iran Desk Officer Henry Wooster has suddenly been transferred to another position. Meanwhile, Vice President Dick Cheney's office is assembling a group of neo-cons from the Pentagon, State Department, and the National Security Council to cook up intelligence and talking points that will show Iran to be an imminent nuclear threat.
Wrap...
This is Iraq democracy?!!!!
From Azzaman/Iraq :
A view of life outside the U.S.-controlled Green Zone
By Naseer al-Zubaidi
Azzaman, August 5, 2006
All over the world people have the chance to give their dead a proper burial but in Iraq.
Iraq is perhaps the only country in the world where the dead are denied this privilege. But the dead are not the only ones who suffer. Iraqis who are still alive fare no better.
We who are still alive lack the basic means of living. We enjoy no stability. There are no public services. We enjoy none of the amenities which people across the world take for granted.
Therefore the Iraqi people are closer to death than life. We can safely say Iraqis are walking shadows. They are dead but still can use their legs to walk and their lungs to breathe.
Walking and breathing are no longer a blessing for Iraqis. If they walk, they will most probably end up victims of a car bomb attack, a stray or deliberate bullet from a passing U.S. convoy or hostages of a murderous criminal gang.
If they walk, they will most probably run into a check point manned by murderous militias. They will have no chance to survive if the militia men discover they are members of the opposite sect.
Breathing fresh air is no longer a pleasure in Iraq because simply there is no more fresh air to breathe. All over Baghdad it is the smell of death, explosions, car bomb attacks, raids and bombing that fills the air.
Some might say that I am a real pessimist for depicting such a gloomy picture of conditions in Iraq.
They may be right. And I fully understand their attitude and know exactly what they have in mind.
They are certainly referring to the few Iraqis who live together with their U.S. masters in the Green Zone in Baghdad which the U.S. occupiers have ringed with massive anti-blast walls.
This zone, created by U.S. marines following their invasion of the country, is the only spot in Iraq which is relatively safe and secure.
U.S. administrators and their Iraqi lackeys who run the country rarely venture outside this zone which the U.S. has turned into something like a citadel of reinforced concrete with several security barriers.
It is tragic to see that those supposedly working for the welfare of the Iraqi people, planning its future and laying down the foundations of a ‘new Iraq’ are so concerned bout their own safety and well-being at a time the whole country is burning.
The zone the U.S. has created in Baghdad to protect its administrators and Iraqi lackeys is the prison which the U.S. has built for itself in the country.
Those working, sleeping, drinking, eating, swimming and playing golf in the zone have become the enemies of the Iraqi people.
If they want to leave, they will need a helicopter because they do not belong to the people outside the zone. Those inside the zone know they are unwanted by the people outside the zone. For this reason they do not feel secure among the people they claim to serve and love.
These are our governing elites – the U.S. and its lackeys – who have practically lost all contact with the people they are supposed to serve.
Wrap...
A view of life outside the U.S.-controlled Green Zone
By Naseer al-Zubaidi
Azzaman, August 5, 2006
All over the world people have the chance to give their dead a proper burial but in Iraq.
Iraq is perhaps the only country in the world where the dead are denied this privilege. But the dead are not the only ones who suffer. Iraqis who are still alive fare no better.
We who are still alive lack the basic means of living. We enjoy no stability. There are no public services. We enjoy none of the amenities which people across the world take for granted.
Therefore the Iraqi people are closer to death than life. We can safely say Iraqis are walking shadows. They are dead but still can use their legs to walk and their lungs to breathe.
Walking and breathing are no longer a blessing for Iraqis. If they walk, they will most probably end up victims of a car bomb attack, a stray or deliberate bullet from a passing U.S. convoy or hostages of a murderous criminal gang.
If they walk, they will most probably run into a check point manned by murderous militias. They will have no chance to survive if the militia men discover they are members of the opposite sect.
Breathing fresh air is no longer a pleasure in Iraq because simply there is no more fresh air to breathe. All over Baghdad it is the smell of death, explosions, car bomb attacks, raids and bombing that fills the air.
Some might say that I am a real pessimist for depicting such a gloomy picture of conditions in Iraq.
They may be right. And I fully understand their attitude and know exactly what they have in mind.
They are certainly referring to the few Iraqis who live together with their U.S. masters in the Green Zone in Baghdad which the U.S. occupiers have ringed with massive anti-blast walls.
This zone, created by U.S. marines following their invasion of the country, is the only spot in Iraq which is relatively safe and secure.
U.S. administrators and their Iraqi lackeys who run the country rarely venture outside this zone which the U.S. has turned into something like a citadel of reinforced concrete with several security barriers.
It is tragic to see that those supposedly working for the welfare of the Iraqi people, planning its future and laying down the foundations of a ‘new Iraq’ are so concerned bout their own safety and well-being at a time the whole country is burning.
The zone the U.S. has created in Baghdad to protect its administrators and Iraqi lackeys is the prison which the U.S. has built for itself in the country.
Those working, sleeping, drinking, eating, swimming and playing golf in the zone have become the enemies of the Iraqi people.
If they want to leave, they will need a helicopter because they do not belong to the people outside the zone. Those inside the zone know they are unwanted by the people outside the zone. For this reason they do not feel secure among the people they claim to serve and love.
These are our governing elites – the U.S. and its lackeys – who have practically lost all contact with the people they are supposed to serve.
Wrap...
BushCo thinks they rule the world....
From Agence France-Presse via truthout.org :
US Names Spy Operations 'Manager' for Cuba, Venezuela
Agence France-Presse
Saturday 19 August 2006
The United States has named a special "manager" for its intelligence operations against Cuba and Venezuela, in effect putting the two Latin American nations on a par with "axis of evil" states confronted on multiple levels by the administration of President George W. Bush.
North Korea and Iran are the only other countries that have been assigned so-called "mission managers," who supervise intelligence operations against them on what the office of national intelligence director called "a strategic level."
In a statement released Friday, the office of National Intelligence Director John Negroponte said the manager would be responsible "for integrating collection and analysis on Cuba and Venezuela across the intelligence community" and "ensuring the implementation of strategies" that have not been disclosed.
"Such efforts are critical today, as policymakers have increasingly focused on the challenges that Cuba and Venezuela pose to American foreign policy," the statement said.
The director's office said the manager would also be asked to ensure "that policymakers have a full range of timely and accurate intelligence on which to base their decisions."
The document did not say what kind of decisions US officials could be making with regard to either of the targeted countries.
For the moment, the task of handling the Havana-Caracas axis fell to 32-year Central Intelligence Agency veteran J. Patrick Maher, whose previous job was deputy director of the CIA's Office of Policy Support.
His biographical sketch supplied in the announcement indicates he was one of the architects of the CIA's current counterterrorism strategy in violence-torn Colombia and managed the agency's operations in the Caribbean basin.
It was not immediately known whether he was directly involved in planning the 1983 US invasion of Grenada in response of a feared Cuban-backed leftist takeover of the island nation.
The statement made it clear, however, that Maher would be only an "acting" manager while search for a permanent candidate for the job was under way.
The decision to name an interim mission manager appeared to betray a sense of urgency in the Bush administration now that Cuba has entered a period of political uncertainty due to an illness of its longtime communist leader, Fidel Castro.
Castro stunned the world on July 31, when he announced he had temporary ceded his presidential powers and the Communist Party leadership to brother Raul Castro, the defense minister, following his gastrointestinal surgery.
Earlier Friday, Raul Castro announced the mobilization of tens of thousands of troops in response to activities by those he called US "war hawks."
The Bush administration has bolstered its propaganda broadcasts to the island in the wake of Castro's illness. Earlier, it announced a plan to spend 80 million dollars in new money to bring about a pro-Western government in Cuba.
On Friday, it rejected the Cuban transition plan, with State Department spokesman Tom Casey insisting that "some kind of dynastic succession on the island are certainly things that are not only not acceptable to us but we think in the long run aren't going to be acceptable to the Cuban people either."
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, a key ally of Castro and the chief supplier of oil to Cuba, said he believed Maher's appointment was also linked to presidential elections that are scheduled in Venezuela for December and that Chavez is widely expected to win.
"This shows us that the empire does not rest, that it is hatching a plan for December or a period before December," the Venezuelan leader told reporters. "But whatever it is, we will thwart it."
Wrap...
US Names Spy Operations 'Manager' for Cuba, Venezuela
Agence France-Presse
Saturday 19 August 2006
The United States has named a special "manager" for its intelligence operations against Cuba and Venezuela, in effect putting the two Latin American nations on a par with "axis of evil" states confronted on multiple levels by the administration of President George W. Bush.
North Korea and Iran are the only other countries that have been assigned so-called "mission managers," who supervise intelligence operations against them on what the office of national intelligence director called "a strategic level."
In a statement released Friday, the office of National Intelligence Director John Negroponte said the manager would be responsible "for integrating collection and analysis on Cuba and Venezuela across the intelligence community" and "ensuring the implementation of strategies" that have not been disclosed.
"Such efforts are critical today, as policymakers have increasingly focused on the challenges that Cuba and Venezuela pose to American foreign policy," the statement said.
The director's office said the manager would also be asked to ensure "that policymakers have a full range of timely and accurate intelligence on which to base their decisions."
The document did not say what kind of decisions US officials could be making with regard to either of the targeted countries.
For the moment, the task of handling the Havana-Caracas axis fell to 32-year Central Intelligence Agency veteran J. Patrick Maher, whose previous job was deputy director of the CIA's Office of Policy Support.
His biographical sketch supplied in the announcement indicates he was one of the architects of the CIA's current counterterrorism strategy in violence-torn Colombia and managed the agency's operations in the Caribbean basin.
It was not immediately known whether he was directly involved in planning the 1983 US invasion of Grenada in response of a feared Cuban-backed leftist takeover of the island nation.
The statement made it clear, however, that Maher would be only an "acting" manager while search for a permanent candidate for the job was under way.
The decision to name an interim mission manager appeared to betray a sense of urgency in the Bush administration now that Cuba has entered a period of political uncertainty due to an illness of its longtime communist leader, Fidel Castro.
Castro stunned the world on July 31, when he announced he had temporary ceded his presidential powers and the Communist Party leadership to brother Raul Castro, the defense minister, following his gastrointestinal surgery.
Earlier Friday, Raul Castro announced the mobilization of tens of thousands of troops in response to activities by those he called US "war hawks."
The Bush administration has bolstered its propaganda broadcasts to the island in the wake of Castro's illness. Earlier, it announced a plan to spend 80 million dollars in new money to bring about a pro-Western government in Cuba.
On Friday, it rejected the Cuban transition plan, with State Department spokesman Tom Casey insisting that "some kind of dynastic succession on the island are certainly things that are not only not acceptable to us but we think in the long run aren't going to be acceptable to the Cuban people either."
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, a key ally of Castro and the chief supplier of oil to Cuba, said he believed Maher's appointment was also linked to presidential elections that are scheduled in Venezuela for December and that Chavez is widely expected to win.
"This shows us that the empire does not rest, that it is hatching a plan for December or a period before December," the Venezuelan leader told reporters. "But whatever it is, we will thwart it."
Wrap...
Friday, August 18, 2006
So. Brazil can but under Cheney oil, US can't ....
From BBC:
Brazil's Alcohol Cars Hit 2 Million Mark
BBC News
Friday 18 August 2006
Brazil's new generation of cars and trucks adapted to run on alcohol has just hit the two-million mark, motor industry figures show.
"Flex-fuel" vehicles, which run on any combination of ethanol and petrol, now make up 77% of the Brazilian market.
Brazil has pioneered the use of ethanol derived from sugar-cane as motor fuel.
Ethanol-driven cars have been on sale there for 25 years, but they have been enjoying a revival since flex-fuel models first appeared in March 2003.
Just 48,200 flex-fuel cars were sold in Brazil in 2003, but the total had reached 1.2 million by the end of last year and had since topped two million, the Brazilian motor manufacturers' association Anfavea said.
Return of Ethanol
Brazil began its Pro-Alcohol programme more than 20 years ago to promote the use of ethanol as an alternative fuel for cars.
At the time, Brazil had a military government, which wanted to reduce the country's dependence on imported Middle Eastern petroleum after the 1970s oil shocks.
The idea fell out of favour in the 1990s after sugar prices rose and the price of oil fell, while Brazil's state oil company Petrobras discovered new offshore oilfields which reduced the need for imports.
But in 2003, a new generation of cars capable of running on alcohol entered production, thanks to a combination of new technology and tax breaks.
"Flex-fuel" cars attract a purchase tax of 14%, while buyers of their exclusively petrol-powered counterparts are charged 16%.
Wrap...
Brazil's Alcohol Cars Hit 2 Million Mark
BBC News
Friday 18 August 2006
Brazil's new generation of cars and trucks adapted to run on alcohol has just hit the two-million mark, motor industry figures show.
"Flex-fuel" vehicles, which run on any combination of ethanol and petrol, now make up 77% of the Brazilian market.
Brazil has pioneered the use of ethanol derived from sugar-cane as motor fuel.
Ethanol-driven cars have been on sale there for 25 years, but they have been enjoying a revival since flex-fuel models first appeared in March 2003.
Just 48,200 flex-fuel cars were sold in Brazil in 2003, but the total had reached 1.2 million by the end of last year and had since topped two million, the Brazilian motor manufacturers' association Anfavea said.
Return of Ethanol
Brazil began its Pro-Alcohol programme more than 20 years ago to promote the use of ethanol as an alternative fuel for cars.
At the time, Brazil had a military government, which wanted to reduce the country's dependence on imported Middle Eastern petroleum after the 1970s oil shocks.
The idea fell out of favour in the 1990s after sugar prices rose and the price of oil fell, while Brazil's state oil company Petrobras discovered new offshore oilfields which reduced the need for imports.
But in 2003, a new generation of cars capable of running on alcohol entered production, thanks to a combination of new technology and tax breaks.
"Flex-fuel" cars attract a purchase tax of 14%, while buyers of their exclusively petrol-powered counterparts are charged 16%.
Wrap...
Thursday, August 17, 2006
BushCo ripping off New Orleans and the Gulf Coast...
From CorpWatch.org via truthout.org :
Big, Easy Money: Disaster Profiteering on the American Gulf Coast
CorpWatch.org
Thursday 17 August 2006
On the first anniversary of Hurricane Katrina, "disaster profiteers" have made millions while local companies and laborers in New Orleans and the rest of the devastated Gulf Coast region are systematically getting the short end of the stick, according to a major new report from the nonprofit CorpWatch.
A CorpWatch analysis of FEMA's records shows that "fully 90 percent of the first wave of (the post-Katrina reconstruction) contracts awarded - including some of the biggest no-bid contracts to date - went to companies from outside the three worst-affected states. As of July 2006, after months of controversy and Congressional hearings, companies from Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama had increased their share of the total contracts to a combined 16.6 percent." The CorpWatch analysis shows that more federal reconstruction contracts have gone to Virginia and Indiana - usually large, politically connected corporations - than to any of the three Katrina-devastated states.
The CorpWatch report also exposes abusive "contracting charge pyramids" where the companies doing the actual reconstruction work often get only a tiny (and insufficient) fraction of the taxpayer money awarded for projects and widespread non-payment of local companies and laborers, including what has been alleged to be the deliberate and systematic exploitation of immigrant workers, including undocumented individuals.
"One year after disaster struck, the slow-motion rebuilding of the Gulf Coast region looks identical to what has happened to date in Afghanistan and Iraq. We see a pattern of profiteering, waste and failure - due to the same flawed contracting system and even many of the same players" says CorpWatch Director Pratap Chatterjee. "The process of getting Katrina-stricken areas back on their feet is needlessly behind schedule, in part, due to the shunning of local business people in favor of politically connected corporations from elsewhere in the U.S. that have used their clout to win lucrative no-bid contracts with little or no accountability and who have done little or no work while ripping off the taxpayer."
"Big, Easy Money" report author Rita J. King said: "The devastation of the Gulf Coast is tragic enough, but the scope of the corporate greed that followed, facilitated by government incompetence and complicity, is downright criminal. Sadly, disaster profiteering has become commonplace in America. Well connected corporations are growing rich off of no-bid contracts while the sub-contractors - the people who actually perform the work - often do so for peanuts, if they get paid at all."
Key Report Findings
A familiar (and disturbing) cast of characters: Many of the same "disaster profiteers" and government agencies that mishandled the reconstruction of Afghanistan and Iraq are responsible for the failure of "reconstruction" of the Gulf Coast region. The Army Corps, Bechtel and Halliburton are using the very same "contract vehicles" in the Gulf Coast as they did in Afghanistan and Iraq. These are "indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity" open-ended "contingency" contracts that are being abused by the contractors on the Gulf Coast to squeeze out local companies. These are also "cost-plus" contracts that allow them to collect a profit on everything they spend, which is an incentive to overspend.
The report lays out these astronomical charges in details. Using non-local companies means that the job is expensive and often botched, as happened in Iraq. Bechtel's reconstruction of schools in Iraq in the summer of 2003 was a case study in unfinished work and overcharging. Also in the summer of 2006, the Pentagon canceled a Bechtel contract to build a hospital in Basra because it was hopelessly behind schedule and had tripled in price. It is perhaps less than surprising that the person in charge of the Army Corps of Engineers today, Lieutenant General Carl A. Strock, is the very man who was in charge of the Halliburton contracts in Iraq. The Army Corps has a less than impressive record in the Mississippi Delta; they are after all, the agency that masterminded the system of levees that have ruined the Delta and failed one year ago to protect area residents.
Abusive "contracting pyramids" that leave the actual subcontractors doing the work with only a tiny amount of the money paid by the federal government. AshBritt's $500 million contract for debris removal amounted to about $23 for every cubic yard of debris removed, according to an NBC News investigation. Ashbritt, in turn hired C&B Enterprises, which was paid $9 per cubic yard. That company hired Amlee Transportation, which was paid $8 per cubic yard. Amlee hired Chris Hessler Inc, which received $7 per cubic yard. Hessler, in turn, hired Les Nirdlinger, a debris hauler from New Jersey, who was paid $3 per cubic yard - less than the cost of doing the work. "Operation Blue Roof" another example; FEMA paid $6.6 million to All American Poly to make the blue tarps that cover so many storm-damaged roofs in the worst-hit areas. FEMA then gave the tarps and the contracts to install them to Shaw Group and Simon Roofing and Sheetmetal of Ohio. Those companies then subcontracted much of the actual work, and those subcontractors further subcontracted. The final cost for each tarp averaged out to almost $2,500 per tarp - almost enough to pay for a new roof in many cases - even tough the tarps were only designed to last 3 months! The workers who actually tacked the tarp onto the roof (a two-hour job) were making closer to minimum wage.
Local companies go unpaid - or are frozen out of the process altogether. Even if a contract is awarded to a small local business, that does not necessarily mean the company ever got paid. Coastal Environments, Inc. (CEI) was paid $150,000 on a $3.1 million contract. In another case, the Army Corps of Engineers awarded a no-bid $39.5 million contract to Alaska-based Akima Site Operations, a firm based more than 3,500 miles from where Katrina made landfall, to provide 450 portable classrooms to Mississippi. A local businessman suing the federal government and Akima has filed papers claiming that he submitted a bid at half the price but was rejected by the Corps of Engineers.
Laborers - particularly immigrant workers - are not getting paid. Victoria Cintra of the Mississippi Immigrants Rights Association (MIRA) said that her small volunteer organization has successfully fought for over $300,000 in pay owed to workers, but the battle is unending. The subcontracting layers are a major part of the problem, each can't pay the next until it gets paid, meaning the laborers on the bottom rung get paid last - if at all. In one case, a contract was granted to Kellogg Brown & Root in Mississippi to rehab the Seabee Naval Base. KBR subcontracted with a company called Tipton Friendly Rollins, which subbed the work to Kansas City Tree, who passed the duties on to a small construction company. The small firm finally hired the workers, many of whom were immigrants, to do the job. The owner of the firm promised food and board, in rickety trailers "not fit for rats," according to Cintra. But after paying her employees for one week's work, the owner of the construction company claimed that she couldn't pay or feed the laborers until she was paid by Kansas City Tree. In the dead of night, she reportedly entered the trailers and awakened the laborers and warned them that immigration agents were on their way. Many of the workers fled. MIRA traced the chain of contracts back to Halliburton and delivered its research to the U.S. Department of Labor (Mississippi does not have a department of labor). Eventually MIRA won the $141,000 in back pay for the construction company's laborers, but many fear deportation or have no permanent addresses, and cannot be found. Rosana Cruz, Gulf Coast field coordinator for the National Immigration Law Center, said: "The level of assault against workers feels like war. There's vulnerability in each successive layer of subcontracting. ... It's shocking that there aren't millions of people across the United States demanding accountability. This is a microcosm of what's happening around the world. If you're poor and you're brown, we can do whatever we want with you."
No good local deed seems to go unpunished. The Vietnamese neighborhood in New Orleans once known as Versailles (for the nearby housing project) has struggled to its feet, with little help from any government agencies. Of the community's 53 businesses, an estimated 45 have opened their doors. Ninety-five percent of the homes have been gutted. The remarkable transformation of the neighborhood was so astonishing that a group affected by the tsunami came from Thailand in June 2006 to find out how it was accomplished so they could put those skills to work at home. The community was so focused on the rebuilding effort that news of a landfill between them and the largest urban wildlife refuge in the nation, Bayou Sauvage, was an unwelcome disruption-but not a complete shock. "If you look around the country," said local pastor Vien thé Nguyen said, "every landfill is near minority people."
--------
Read the report (text version).
Wrap...
Big, Easy Money: Disaster Profiteering on the American Gulf Coast
CorpWatch.org
Thursday 17 August 2006
On the first anniversary of Hurricane Katrina, "disaster profiteers" have made millions while local companies and laborers in New Orleans and the rest of the devastated Gulf Coast region are systematically getting the short end of the stick, according to a major new report from the nonprofit CorpWatch.
A CorpWatch analysis of FEMA's records shows that "fully 90 percent of the first wave of (the post-Katrina reconstruction) contracts awarded - including some of the biggest no-bid contracts to date - went to companies from outside the three worst-affected states. As of July 2006, after months of controversy and Congressional hearings, companies from Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama had increased their share of the total contracts to a combined 16.6 percent." The CorpWatch analysis shows that more federal reconstruction contracts have gone to Virginia and Indiana - usually large, politically connected corporations - than to any of the three Katrina-devastated states.
The CorpWatch report also exposes abusive "contracting charge pyramids" where the companies doing the actual reconstruction work often get only a tiny (and insufficient) fraction of the taxpayer money awarded for projects and widespread non-payment of local companies and laborers, including what has been alleged to be the deliberate and systematic exploitation of immigrant workers, including undocumented individuals.
"One year after disaster struck, the slow-motion rebuilding of the Gulf Coast region looks identical to what has happened to date in Afghanistan and Iraq. We see a pattern of profiteering, waste and failure - due to the same flawed contracting system and even many of the same players" says CorpWatch Director Pratap Chatterjee. "The process of getting Katrina-stricken areas back on their feet is needlessly behind schedule, in part, due to the shunning of local business people in favor of politically connected corporations from elsewhere in the U.S. that have used their clout to win lucrative no-bid contracts with little or no accountability and who have done little or no work while ripping off the taxpayer."
"Big, Easy Money" report author Rita J. King said: "The devastation of the Gulf Coast is tragic enough, but the scope of the corporate greed that followed, facilitated by government incompetence and complicity, is downright criminal. Sadly, disaster profiteering has become commonplace in America. Well connected corporations are growing rich off of no-bid contracts while the sub-contractors - the people who actually perform the work - often do so for peanuts, if they get paid at all."
Key Report Findings
A familiar (and disturbing) cast of characters: Many of the same "disaster profiteers" and government agencies that mishandled the reconstruction of Afghanistan and Iraq are responsible for the failure of "reconstruction" of the Gulf Coast region. The Army Corps, Bechtel and Halliburton are using the very same "contract vehicles" in the Gulf Coast as they did in Afghanistan and Iraq. These are "indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity" open-ended "contingency" contracts that are being abused by the contractors on the Gulf Coast to squeeze out local companies. These are also "cost-plus" contracts that allow them to collect a profit on everything they spend, which is an incentive to overspend.
The report lays out these astronomical charges in details. Using non-local companies means that the job is expensive and often botched, as happened in Iraq. Bechtel's reconstruction of schools in Iraq in the summer of 2003 was a case study in unfinished work and overcharging. Also in the summer of 2006, the Pentagon canceled a Bechtel contract to build a hospital in Basra because it was hopelessly behind schedule and had tripled in price. It is perhaps less than surprising that the person in charge of the Army Corps of Engineers today, Lieutenant General Carl A. Strock, is the very man who was in charge of the Halliburton contracts in Iraq. The Army Corps has a less than impressive record in the Mississippi Delta; they are after all, the agency that masterminded the system of levees that have ruined the Delta and failed one year ago to protect area residents.
Abusive "contracting pyramids" that leave the actual subcontractors doing the work with only a tiny amount of the money paid by the federal government. AshBritt's $500 million contract for debris removal amounted to about $23 for every cubic yard of debris removed, according to an NBC News investigation. Ashbritt, in turn hired C&B Enterprises, which was paid $9 per cubic yard. That company hired Amlee Transportation, which was paid $8 per cubic yard. Amlee hired Chris Hessler Inc, which received $7 per cubic yard. Hessler, in turn, hired Les Nirdlinger, a debris hauler from New Jersey, who was paid $3 per cubic yard - less than the cost of doing the work. "Operation Blue Roof" another example; FEMA paid $6.6 million to All American Poly to make the blue tarps that cover so many storm-damaged roofs in the worst-hit areas. FEMA then gave the tarps and the contracts to install them to Shaw Group and Simon Roofing and Sheetmetal of Ohio. Those companies then subcontracted much of the actual work, and those subcontractors further subcontracted. The final cost for each tarp averaged out to almost $2,500 per tarp - almost enough to pay for a new roof in many cases - even tough the tarps were only designed to last 3 months! The workers who actually tacked the tarp onto the roof (a two-hour job) were making closer to minimum wage.
Local companies go unpaid - or are frozen out of the process altogether. Even if a contract is awarded to a small local business, that does not necessarily mean the company ever got paid. Coastal Environments, Inc. (CEI) was paid $150,000 on a $3.1 million contract. In another case, the Army Corps of Engineers awarded a no-bid $39.5 million contract to Alaska-based Akima Site Operations, a firm based more than 3,500 miles from where Katrina made landfall, to provide 450 portable classrooms to Mississippi. A local businessman suing the federal government and Akima has filed papers claiming that he submitted a bid at half the price but was rejected by the Corps of Engineers.
Laborers - particularly immigrant workers - are not getting paid. Victoria Cintra of the Mississippi Immigrants Rights Association (MIRA) said that her small volunteer organization has successfully fought for over $300,000 in pay owed to workers, but the battle is unending. The subcontracting layers are a major part of the problem, each can't pay the next until it gets paid, meaning the laborers on the bottom rung get paid last - if at all. In one case, a contract was granted to Kellogg Brown & Root in Mississippi to rehab the Seabee Naval Base. KBR subcontracted with a company called Tipton Friendly Rollins, which subbed the work to Kansas City Tree, who passed the duties on to a small construction company. The small firm finally hired the workers, many of whom were immigrants, to do the job. The owner of the firm promised food and board, in rickety trailers "not fit for rats," according to Cintra. But after paying her employees for one week's work, the owner of the construction company claimed that she couldn't pay or feed the laborers until she was paid by Kansas City Tree. In the dead of night, she reportedly entered the trailers and awakened the laborers and warned them that immigration agents were on their way. Many of the workers fled. MIRA traced the chain of contracts back to Halliburton and delivered its research to the U.S. Department of Labor (Mississippi does not have a department of labor). Eventually MIRA won the $141,000 in back pay for the construction company's laborers, but many fear deportation or have no permanent addresses, and cannot be found. Rosana Cruz, Gulf Coast field coordinator for the National Immigration Law Center, said: "The level of assault against workers feels like war. There's vulnerability in each successive layer of subcontracting. ... It's shocking that there aren't millions of people across the United States demanding accountability. This is a microcosm of what's happening around the world. If you're poor and you're brown, we can do whatever we want with you."
No good local deed seems to go unpunished. The Vietnamese neighborhood in New Orleans once known as Versailles (for the nearby housing project) has struggled to its feet, with little help from any government agencies. Of the community's 53 businesses, an estimated 45 have opened their doors. Ninety-five percent of the homes have been gutted. The remarkable transformation of the neighborhood was so astonishing that a group affected by the tsunami came from Thailand in June 2006 to find out how it was accomplished so they could put those skills to work at home. The community was so focused on the rebuilding effort that news of a landfill between them and the largest urban wildlife refuge in the nation, Bayou Sauvage, was an unwelcome disruption-but not a complete shock. "If you look around the country," said local pastor Vien thé Nguyen said, "every landfill is near minority people."
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Read the report (text version).
Wrap...
Kitty Kelly and Randy Cunningham's wife...
From The New Republic via truthout.org :
Kitty Kelley Ace in the Hole: Duke Cunningham's Wife Tells All
http://www.truthout.org/docs_2006/081706F.shtml
Kitty Kelley writes, "I did not know what to expect when a friend of Nancy Cunningham's lawyer contacted me. He said she had not talked to anyone in the press, but she would talk to me for the New Republic because she wanted a national platform for her side of the story. There would be no ground rules to the interview, and she would speak freely about her husband, from whom she is estranged."
Wrap...
Kitty Kelley Ace in the Hole: Duke Cunningham's Wife Tells All
http://www.truthout.org/docs_2006/081706F.shtml
Kitty Kelley writes, "I did not know what to expect when a friend of Nancy Cunningham's lawyer contacted me. He said she had not talked to anyone in the press, but she would talk to me for the New Republic because she wanted a national platform for her side of the story. There would be no ground rules to the interview, and she would speak freely about her husband, from whom she is estranged."
Wrap...
The US Power Grid...in bad shape....
From truthout.org :
Three Years After Blackout, Power Problems Persist
By Jason Leopold
t r u t h o u t Perspective
Thursday 17 August 2006
Three years ago this week, a devastating blackout left 50 million people in the dark in the Northeastern United States and parts of Canada for nearly three days, forced the closure of the New York Stock Exchange, resulting in a $10 billion economic loss, and proved that our domestic infrastructure is vulnerable to even minor accidents and human error.
Today, the US power grid - three interconnected grids made up of 3,500 utilities serving 283 million people - still hangs together by a thread, and its dilapidated state is perhaps one of the greatest threats to homeland security, as opposed to, say, that vial of lip gloss in your purse or the bottle of shampoo in your travel bag.
The slightest glitch on the transmission superhighway could upset the smooth distribution of electricity over thousands of miles of transmission lines and darken states from Ohio to New York in a matter of seconds, bringing hospitals and airports to a standstill and putting an untold number of lives at risk.
According to George Gross, a University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign professor of electrical and computer engineering who specializes in utility policy, a serious lack of investment in the power grid continues to put reliability at risk and is the "Achilles heel" of the country's electric system.
"The August 2003 blackout was a wake-up call for the country to upgrade its transmission grid system," Gross said. "But the truth is that very few major transmission projects have been constructed and, as a result, transmission capacity has failed to keep pace with the expansion of power demand."
Immediately following the August 14, 2003, blackout President Bush said publicly that he would see to it that the nation's aging power grid would quickly be updated in order to avoid future blackouts and to handle the increase in demand.
Severe power shortages and rolling blackouts have become a daily occurrence around the country over the past few years as the antiquated power grid is continuously stretched beyond its means - mainly a result of electricity deregulation - whereby power is sent hundreds of miles across the grid to consumers by out-of-state power companies instead of being sent directly to consumers by their local utilities, which is what the grid was designed for.
For the most part, power companies maintain grid reliability by following voluntary guidelines designed by the power industry, just like the voluntary emissions limits that the fossil-fuel industry says it upholds. Last year, Congress passed an energy bill that required mandatory standards that included monetary penalties, but the rules are months away from being finalized.
The US-Canadian task force that investigated the August 2003 blackout found numerous violations of the voluntary standards, and concluded that utilities botched routine monitoring of transmission lines and failed to trim trees along transmission passageways.
Still, in the three years that have passed since the worst blackout in US history blanketed the Northeast, nothing substantial has been done to overhaul the power grid, and that puts reliability in jeopardy, and lives at risk, as demonstrated by the dozens of scattered blackouts in the month of July throughout the nation this summer - one of the hottest on record.
Since July, all seven of the country's regional grid operators that monitor power flow throughout the nation reported record electricity consumption as temperatures increased. Blackouts struck many parts of the country during the month of July, not because of a shortage of supply, but because the dilapidated power grid could not handle the amount of electricity that was sent back and forth across the transmission lines.
Demand for electricity is expected to increase by 45 percent by 2025, according to the North American Electric Reliability Council, a power industry-funded organization that was named by federal regulators last month as the new watchdog group in charge of overseeing the rules for operating the nation's power grid.
Last year, US peak demand for electricity grew by 7.7 percent over the summer of 2004, with double-digit growth in the Northeast and the Midwest regions. New England saw a 4 percent increase, on top of last year's 11 percent increase. New York also experienced a 4 percent increase, following a 13 percent increase last year.
"In some cases, demand has reached levels that were not expected for another three or four years," said Jone-Lin Wang, a senior director at Cambridge Energy Research Associates. "Very hot weather tends to cause more incidents of equipment failure in the distribution systems. Although the bulk power system provided adequate supply, extreme heat and surging demand put the distribution systems through extreme stress, leading to some equipment failures and localized power outages."
But neither the Bush administration nor federal lawmakers have developed a comprehensive plan to handle, at the very least, the annual increase in demand. Blackouts will likely become more frequent in areas like New York and New England, Wang said.
"We are concerned about New England because there is nothing in the pipeline, but some small renewable projects and wind," Wang said in an interview earlier this month with Reuters. "New England is in trouble."
The 2003 blackout led to calls for spending of up to $100 billion to reduce severe transmission bottlenecks and increase capacity so the transmission lines can carry additional electricity from power plants to homes and businesses.
But investment in the grid has lagged, and progress has been slow.
"Demand growth is forecasted to be 20 percent between 1998 to 2008, but the increase in transmission capacity is still below 5 percent," Gross said. "The need to strengthen the existing transmission infrastructure, to expand it and to effectively harness advances in technology constitutes the single most pressing challenge for the country's electricity system."
Craig Baker, senior vice president of American Electric Power Co., the Columbus, Ohio, utility that operates the nation's largest private transmission system, told the Wall Street Journal last month that federal intervention may help, but there's still the question of who will pay for the billions of dollars needed to build transmission lines.
"We're all looking at massive transmission expenses," he said.
Jason Leopold is former Los Angeles bureau chief for Dow Jones Newswire. He has written over 2,000 stories on the California energy crisis and received the Dow Jones Journalist of the Year Award in 2001 for his coverage on the issue as well as a Project Censored award in 2004. Leopold also reported extensively on Enron's downfall and was the first journalist to land an interview with former Enron president Jeffrey Skilling following Enron's bankruptcy filing in December 2001. Leopold has appeared on CNBC and National Public Radio as an expert on energy policy and has also been the keynote speaker at more than two dozen energy industry conferences around the country.
Wrap...
Three Years After Blackout, Power Problems Persist
By Jason Leopold
t r u t h o u t Perspective
Thursday 17 August 2006
Three years ago this week, a devastating blackout left 50 million people in the dark in the Northeastern United States and parts of Canada for nearly three days, forced the closure of the New York Stock Exchange, resulting in a $10 billion economic loss, and proved that our domestic infrastructure is vulnerable to even minor accidents and human error.
Today, the US power grid - three interconnected grids made up of 3,500 utilities serving 283 million people - still hangs together by a thread, and its dilapidated state is perhaps one of the greatest threats to homeland security, as opposed to, say, that vial of lip gloss in your purse or the bottle of shampoo in your travel bag.
The slightest glitch on the transmission superhighway could upset the smooth distribution of electricity over thousands of miles of transmission lines and darken states from Ohio to New York in a matter of seconds, bringing hospitals and airports to a standstill and putting an untold number of lives at risk.
According to George Gross, a University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign professor of electrical and computer engineering who specializes in utility policy, a serious lack of investment in the power grid continues to put reliability at risk and is the "Achilles heel" of the country's electric system.
"The August 2003 blackout was a wake-up call for the country to upgrade its transmission grid system," Gross said. "But the truth is that very few major transmission projects have been constructed and, as a result, transmission capacity has failed to keep pace with the expansion of power demand."
Immediately following the August 14, 2003, blackout President Bush said publicly that he would see to it that the nation's aging power grid would quickly be updated in order to avoid future blackouts and to handle the increase in demand.
Severe power shortages and rolling blackouts have become a daily occurrence around the country over the past few years as the antiquated power grid is continuously stretched beyond its means - mainly a result of electricity deregulation - whereby power is sent hundreds of miles across the grid to consumers by out-of-state power companies instead of being sent directly to consumers by their local utilities, which is what the grid was designed for.
For the most part, power companies maintain grid reliability by following voluntary guidelines designed by the power industry, just like the voluntary emissions limits that the fossil-fuel industry says it upholds. Last year, Congress passed an energy bill that required mandatory standards that included monetary penalties, but the rules are months away from being finalized.
The US-Canadian task force that investigated the August 2003 blackout found numerous violations of the voluntary standards, and concluded that utilities botched routine monitoring of transmission lines and failed to trim trees along transmission passageways.
Still, in the three years that have passed since the worst blackout in US history blanketed the Northeast, nothing substantial has been done to overhaul the power grid, and that puts reliability in jeopardy, and lives at risk, as demonstrated by the dozens of scattered blackouts in the month of July throughout the nation this summer - one of the hottest on record.
Since July, all seven of the country's regional grid operators that monitor power flow throughout the nation reported record electricity consumption as temperatures increased. Blackouts struck many parts of the country during the month of July, not because of a shortage of supply, but because the dilapidated power grid could not handle the amount of electricity that was sent back and forth across the transmission lines.
Demand for electricity is expected to increase by 45 percent by 2025, according to the North American Electric Reliability Council, a power industry-funded organization that was named by federal regulators last month as the new watchdog group in charge of overseeing the rules for operating the nation's power grid.
Last year, US peak demand for electricity grew by 7.7 percent over the summer of 2004, with double-digit growth in the Northeast and the Midwest regions. New England saw a 4 percent increase, on top of last year's 11 percent increase. New York also experienced a 4 percent increase, following a 13 percent increase last year.
"In some cases, demand has reached levels that were not expected for another three or four years," said Jone-Lin Wang, a senior director at Cambridge Energy Research Associates. "Very hot weather tends to cause more incidents of equipment failure in the distribution systems. Although the bulk power system provided adequate supply, extreme heat and surging demand put the distribution systems through extreme stress, leading to some equipment failures and localized power outages."
But neither the Bush administration nor federal lawmakers have developed a comprehensive plan to handle, at the very least, the annual increase in demand. Blackouts will likely become more frequent in areas like New York and New England, Wang said.
"We are concerned about New England because there is nothing in the pipeline, but some small renewable projects and wind," Wang said in an interview earlier this month with Reuters. "New England is in trouble."
The 2003 blackout led to calls for spending of up to $100 billion to reduce severe transmission bottlenecks and increase capacity so the transmission lines can carry additional electricity from power plants to homes and businesses.
But investment in the grid has lagged, and progress has been slow.
"Demand growth is forecasted to be 20 percent between 1998 to 2008, but the increase in transmission capacity is still below 5 percent," Gross said. "The need to strengthen the existing transmission infrastructure, to expand it and to effectively harness advances in technology constitutes the single most pressing challenge for the country's electricity system."
Craig Baker, senior vice president of American Electric Power Co., the Columbus, Ohio, utility that operates the nation's largest private transmission system, told the Wall Street Journal last month that federal intervention may help, but there's still the question of who will pay for the billions of dollars needed to build transmission lines.
"We're all looking at massive transmission expenses," he said.
Jason Leopold is former Los Angeles bureau chief for Dow Jones Newswire. He has written over 2,000 stories on the California energy crisis and received the Dow Jones Journalist of the Year Award in 2001 for his coverage on the issue as well as a Project Censored award in 2004. Leopold also reported extensively on Enron's downfall and was the first journalist to land an interview with former Enron president Jeffrey Skilling following Enron's bankruptcy filing in December 2001. Leopold has appeared on CNBC and National Public Radio as an expert on energy policy and has also been the keynote speaker at more than two dozen energy industry conferences around the country.
Wrap...
Wednesday, August 16, 2006
Mercenaries $$$$ / White House Press Corp gone...
From WayneMadsenReport.com
Aug. 16, 2006 -- Mercenaries, mercenaries, everywhere. The Bush administration continues to be a dream-come-true for mercenary firms. In just a a little over a week, Blackwater USA received a $7.1 million contract for personal security detail services in Baghdad. Interestingly, the contract is due to expire on September 30, 2008.
Dyncorp received a contract to "re-train" the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLM/A) of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement into a "professional" fighting force. The SPLM/A is the southern Sudanese guerrilla force that signed a peace agreement with the Sudanese central government in Khartoum.
Neighboring Uganda already serves as a hub for U.S. mercenary and CIA activity in central and eastern Africa. Large oil reserves have been discovered in areas under the control of the SPLM.
Aug. 16, 2006 -- From our National Press Club sources who cover the White House: the White House Press Corps was told that its move from the White House to "temporary" quarters in the New Executive Office Building across Pennsylvania Avenue (which is now more like Red Square than an avenue) is far from temporary.
The Bush White House promised that renovations to the James Brady Press Briefing Room will take nine months. However, WMR's sources who cover the White House that the press corps will remain in the New Executive Office Building for the duration of the Bush administration.
White House Press Secretary Tony Snow, a former talking head on Fox News, consistently arranges for his Fox friends to get exclusive stories ahead of their competitors. With the press corps now out of the White House, Fox has a tremendous advantage over other news networks.
The last time the press corps was temporarily moved out of the White House was 1902.
Wrap...
Aug. 16, 2006 -- Mercenaries, mercenaries, everywhere. The Bush administration continues to be a dream-come-true for mercenary firms. In just a a little over a week, Blackwater USA received a $7.1 million contract for personal security detail services in Baghdad. Interestingly, the contract is due to expire on September 30, 2008.
Dyncorp received a contract to "re-train" the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLM/A) of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement into a "professional" fighting force. The SPLM/A is the southern Sudanese guerrilla force that signed a peace agreement with the Sudanese central government in Khartoum.
Neighboring Uganda already serves as a hub for U.S. mercenary and CIA activity in central and eastern Africa. Large oil reserves have been discovered in areas under the control of the SPLM.
Aug. 16, 2006 -- From our National Press Club sources who cover the White House: the White House Press Corps was told that its move from the White House to "temporary" quarters in the New Executive Office Building across Pennsylvania Avenue (which is now more like Red Square than an avenue) is far from temporary.
The Bush White House promised that renovations to the James Brady Press Briefing Room will take nine months. However, WMR's sources who cover the White House that the press corps will remain in the New Executive Office Building for the duration of the Bush administration.
White House Press Secretary Tony Snow, a former talking head on Fox News, consistently arranges for his Fox friends to get exclusive stories ahead of their competitors. With the press corps now out of the White House, Fox has a tremendous advantage over other news networks.
The last time the press corps was temporarily moved out of the White House was 1902.
Wrap...
Some good books for your shelf....
From Publishers Lunch Weekly:
FICTION/GENERAL/OTHER:
Robert Anthony Siegel's ALL WILL BE REVEALED, about a wheelchair-bound millionaire pornographer and a widowed spiritualist whose husband was lost in a polar expedition, to Kate Nitze at MacAdam/Cage, in a two-book deal, by Geri Thoma at the Elaine Markson Agency (world). kate@macadamcage.com
Kenneth J. Harvey's INSIDE, about a wrongfully accused man freed after fourteen years in prison and the forces luring him back, to Drenka Willen at Harcourt, by Sally Harding at The Harding Agency (US). reception@thehardingagency.com
CHILDREN'S/YOUNG ADULT:
Cheryl Diamond's DIARY OF A NEW YORK MODEL, a humorous account of the author's life as a successful teenage high-fashion model, to Nancy Conescu at Little, Brown Children's, in a nice deal, at auction, by Regina Ryan at Regina Ryan Publishing Enterprises (World English).
UK:
Rights to Peter Behrens's debut THE LAW OF DREAMS, to Jessica Craig at Canongate, for six figures, in a pre-empt, by Arabella Stein, on behalf of Sarah Burnes at The Gernert Company.
NON-FICTION/ADVICE/RELATIONSHIPS:
Journalist Diane Mapes' THE DIRT ON DATING: The 100-Year History of the Rocky Road to Love, a pop history of dating, offering highlights and horror stories from the frontlines of dating in its short but tumultuous past, from "petting bandits" to man shortages to dating scams, to Christel Winkler in her first purchase at Wiley, at auction, by Ben Salmon at Rights Unlimited (world English).mailto:.bsalmon@rightsunlimited.com
BIOGRAPHY:
Larry Tye's SATCHEL, a biography of Satchel Paige and the story of desegration in the US, to Will Murphy at Random House, at auction, by Jill Kneerim at Kneerim & Williams (NA).
American professor of history at the Jagiellonian University in Krakow Patrick Vaughan's professional and political biography of former national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, focusing on the power and influence Brzezinski exerted as a political thinker and actor during the Cold War and post-Cold War eras, draw upon newly available original sources and documents, to Paul Golob at Times Books, by Leona Schecter at the Leona P. Schecter Agency (world).mailto:.claire.mckinney@hholt.com
THE KNIFE MAN author Wendy Moore's WEDLOCK: How Georgian Britain's worst husband met his match, a biography of Mary Eleanor Bowes (an ancestor of Elizabeth Bowes-Lyon), who became one of Britain's richest heiresses at the age of eleven, and her marriage to Andrew Robinson Stoney, the ancestor of the man on whom Thackeray based The Luck of Barry Lydon, and the origin behind the phrase 'ston(e)y broke,' to Alison McCabe at Crown, by Emma Parry at Fletcher & Parry, and to Kirsty Dunseath at Weidenfeld & Nicolson, by Patrick Walsh at Conville & Walsh.
HISTORY/POLITICS/CURRENT AFFAIRS:
Mark Bowen's MERCURY RISING, in which climate expert and NASA scientist Dr. James Hansen reveals the real science behind global warming, the practical solutions, and an uncensored account of the Bush Administration's efforts to suppress the truth, to Brian Tart and Mitch Hoffman at Dutton, by Amy Hughes at The Gernert Company (world).mailto:.hughes.aa@gmail.com
Professor John Mueller's OVERBLOWN, offering a look at the real nature (and danger) of terrorism, arguing that it actually causes little damage and that the physical, psychic, and economic costs arise less from anything terrorists have done than from the fears and reactions terrorism inspires, to Bruce Nichols at Free Press, by Jill Marsal at Sandra Dijkstra Literary Agency.
MEMOIR:
The mother of football player and soldier Pat Tillman, Mary Tillman and SF Chronicle deputy editor Narda Zacchino's untitled book about Mary's efforts to learn the truth surrounding the death of Pat, 27, while on patrol in Afghanistan -- which sparked six different Pentagon investigations -- also looking at his life, the meaning of patriotism, and the nature of sacrifice, to Ellen Archer and Will Schwalbe at Hyperion, with Leslie Wells editing, for publication in 2007, by Steve Wasserman at Kneerim & Williams.
Shoshana Johnson and Paul Brown's ONE WRONG TURN: The Shoshana Johnson Story, the memoir of the first American woman of color to become a prisoner of war in Iraq, captured in same ambush as colleagues Jessica Lynch and Pfc. Lori Ann Piestewa, who did not survive her injuries, including telling of her capture and post-Iraq day-to-day life, to Laurie Parkin at Dafina, with Michaela Hamilton editing, for publication in May 2007, by Craig Wiley at the Craig Wiley Agency (world).
SPORTS:
Sports Illustrated writer Austin Murphy's SATURDAY RULES, an in-depth look at the 2006 football season, focusing on the rivalry between Notre Dame and USC, to Jennifer Barth at Holt, by David Black of the David Black Literary Agency (NA).mailto:.claire.mckinney@hholt.com
Rich Eisen's TOTAL ACCESS: Journey to the Center of the Football Universe, taking readers and fans inside the pro football season that never ends, from the rookie draft to the broadcast booth to the playoffs and the Super Bowl, to Pete Wolverton at Thomas Dunne Books, by Rafe Sagalyn of The Sagalyn Agency.
Wrap...
FICTION/GENERAL/OTHER:
Robert Anthony Siegel's ALL WILL BE REVEALED, about a wheelchair-bound millionaire pornographer and a widowed spiritualist whose husband was lost in a polar expedition, to Kate Nitze at MacAdam/Cage, in a two-book deal, by Geri Thoma at the Elaine Markson Agency (world). kate@macadamcage.com
Kenneth J. Harvey's INSIDE, about a wrongfully accused man freed after fourteen years in prison and the forces luring him back, to Drenka Willen at Harcourt, by Sally Harding at The Harding Agency (US). reception@thehardingagency.com
CHILDREN'S/YOUNG ADULT:
Cheryl Diamond's DIARY OF A NEW YORK MODEL, a humorous account of the author's life as a successful teenage high-fashion model, to Nancy Conescu at Little, Brown Children's, in a nice deal, at auction, by Regina Ryan at Regina Ryan Publishing Enterprises (World English).
UK:
Rights to Peter Behrens's debut THE LAW OF DREAMS, to Jessica Craig at Canongate, for six figures, in a pre-empt, by Arabella Stein, on behalf of Sarah Burnes at The Gernert Company.
NON-FICTION/ADVICE/RELATIONSHIPS:
Journalist Diane Mapes' THE DIRT ON DATING: The 100-Year History of the Rocky Road to Love, a pop history of dating, offering highlights and horror stories from the frontlines of dating in its short but tumultuous past, from "petting bandits" to man shortages to dating scams, to Christel Winkler in her first purchase at Wiley, at auction, by Ben Salmon at Rights Unlimited (world English).mailto:.bsalmon@rightsunlimited.com
BIOGRAPHY:
Larry Tye's SATCHEL, a biography of Satchel Paige and the story of desegration in the US, to Will Murphy at Random House, at auction, by Jill Kneerim at Kneerim & Williams (NA).
American professor of history at the Jagiellonian University in Krakow Patrick Vaughan's professional and political biography of former national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, focusing on the power and influence Brzezinski exerted as a political thinker and actor during the Cold War and post-Cold War eras, draw upon newly available original sources and documents, to Paul Golob at Times Books, by Leona Schecter at the Leona P. Schecter Agency (world).mailto:.claire.mckinney@hholt.com
THE KNIFE MAN author Wendy Moore's WEDLOCK: How Georgian Britain's worst husband met his match, a biography of Mary Eleanor Bowes (an ancestor of Elizabeth Bowes-Lyon), who became one of Britain's richest heiresses at the age of eleven, and her marriage to Andrew Robinson Stoney, the ancestor of the man on whom Thackeray based The Luck of Barry Lydon, and the origin behind the phrase 'ston(e)y broke,' to Alison McCabe at Crown, by Emma Parry at Fletcher & Parry, and to Kirsty Dunseath at Weidenfeld & Nicolson, by Patrick Walsh at Conville & Walsh.
HISTORY/POLITICS/CURRENT AFFAIRS:
Mark Bowen's MERCURY RISING, in which climate expert and NASA scientist Dr. James Hansen reveals the real science behind global warming, the practical solutions, and an uncensored account of the Bush Administration's efforts to suppress the truth, to Brian Tart and Mitch Hoffman at Dutton, by Amy Hughes at The Gernert Company (world).mailto:.hughes.aa@gmail.com
Professor John Mueller's OVERBLOWN, offering a look at the real nature (and danger) of terrorism, arguing that it actually causes little damage and that the physical, psychic, and economic costs arise less from anything terrorists have done than from the fears and reactions terrorism inspires, to Bruce Nichols at Free Press, by Jill Marsal at Sandra Dijkstra Literary Agency.
MEMOIR:
The mother of football player and soldier Pat Tillman, Mary Tillman and SF Chronicle deputy editor Narda Zacchino's untitled book about Mary's efforts to learn the truth surrounding the death of Pat, 27, while on patrol in Afghanistan -- which sparked six different Pentagon investigations -- also looking at his life, the meaning of patriotism, and the nature of sacrifice, to Ellen Archer and Will Schwalbe at Hyperion, with Leslie Wells editing, for publication in 2007, by Steve Wasserman at Kneerim & Williams.
Shoshana Johnson and Paul Brown's ONE WRONG TURN: The Shoshana Johnson Story, the memoir of the first American woman of color to become a prisoner of war in Iraq, captured in same ambush as colleagues Jessica Lynch and Pfc. Lori Ann Piestewa, who did not survive her injuries, including telling of her capture and post-Iraq day-to-day life, to Laurie Parkin at Dafina, with Michaela Hamilton editing, for publication in May 2007, by Craig Wiley at the Craig Wiley Agency (world).
SPORTS:
Sports Illustrated writer Austin Murphy's SATURDAY RULES, an in-depth look at the 2006 football season, focusing on the rivalry between Notre Dame and USC, to Jennifer Barth at Holt, by David Black of the David Black Literary Agency (NA).mailto:.claire.mckinney@hholt.com
Rich Eisen's TOTAL ACCESS: Journey to the Center of the Football Universe, taking readers and fans inside the pro football season that never ends, from the rookie draft to the broadcast booth to the playoffs and the Super Bowl, to Pete Wolverton at Thomas Dunne Books, by Rafe Sagalyn of The Sagalyn Agency.
Wrap...
al Qaeda possibles: trains and hotels?
From Strategic Forecasting, Inc:
The U.K. Plot: Lessons Not Learned and Risk Implications
By Fred Burton
British authorities have made more than two dozen arrests, mostly of British citizens of Pakistani origin, in and around London and Birmingham since Aug. 10 in connection with a plot involving airliners. Of that group, 24 currently remain in custody; another seven suspects reportedly have been arrested in Pakistan.
Details of the foiled operation -- which would have involved blowing up nine flights bound for New York City, Washington, D.C., and California -- clearly fit al Qaeda's operational and tactical profile on several levels. Specifically, the plan bears several trademarks associated with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM), the captured operational planner who was called "the principal architect of the 9/11 operation" in the 9/11 Commission Report.
These trademarks include the choice of aircraft as a target; the notion of multiple, simultaneous strikes; and the use of modular improvised explosive devices, which would have been smuggled aboard the aircraft in carry-on luggage. Moreover, whoever was involved in planning the U.K. operation shared KSM's penchant for "thinking big."
This yen for the grandiose attack, as opposed to a merely effective one, has at times caused al Qaeda operations to fail -- and perhaps did so here as well. However, in considering this failed operation, it is important to remember another element that has run through al Qaeda's history of operations: a tendency to have multiple attacks in various stages of planning at any given time. It is entirely possible that, as the world focuses on the United Kingdom and international air travel, other plots involving different target sets and other parts of the globe could be in motion.
The KSM Trademarks
The U.K. plot is striking, first, because it hearkens back not only to Sept. 11, but to KSM and his long-running fascination with exploding aircraft. KSM was the principal planner of al Qaeda's "planes operation."
As originally conceived, this plan was to involve the simultaneous hijackings of 10 aircraft, departing from both the east and west coasts of the United States. Nine of the aircraft were to be either blown up in-flight or slammed into targeted buildings. KSM envisioned himself landing the 10th plane at a U.S. airport and (after killing all adult male passengers) delivering a speech outlining al Qaeda's grievances with the United States. Al Qaeda's apex leaders -- Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri and Mohammed Atef -- eventually agreed to a scaled-down version of the planes operation, which was carried out on Sept. 11, 2001.
The west coast portion of the plan was spun off as a separate operation that was to have occurred in October 2001, but which reportedly was postponed several times for various reasons. This operation, also known as the Library Tower Plot, was compromised and disrupted in 2002. KSM also is believed to have been involved in the plot to bomb American Airlines Flight 63 in December 2001. That plan nearly succeeded: Richard Reid successfully smuggled his "shoe bomb" aboard the aircraft. The attempt failed only because Reid tried to light the fuse for his bomb in the passenger cabin (rather than a more secluded area, such as a restroom) and was stopped by a flight attendant and passengers.
The U.K. plot bears perhaps the strongest resemblance, however, to Operation Bojinka, which KSM (along with his nephew, Abdel Basit) helped to plan and finance while living in Manila in the mid-1990s. The tactical similarities here include the use of modular explosive devices, which would have been assembled in-flight after operatives accessed their carry-on baggage, and the use of liquid explosives.
Grand Schemes
The very scope of the U.K. plot also highlights another KSM trait: a tendency to think big. This characteristic was the undoing of several important al Qaeda attacks, such as the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and an attempted strike against the USS The Sullivans, off the coast of Yemen, in January 2000. In the World Trade Center case, a massive truck bomb was built, delivered and detonated -- resulting in six deaths and hundreds of injuries. Because the goal was to topple Tower One into Tower Two and destroy the entire landmark in spectacular fashion, the planners decided to place the truck bomb in the basement parking garage (rather than at street level, where, it turns out, it would have been far more deadly). The robust construction of the buildings withstood the blast.
The attempt to strike The Sullivans with a suicide boat bomber also floundered due to overreach; the militants filled the boat with too many explosives, causing the craft to sink before it could reach the target. Significantly, al Qaeda operatives used the same tactics 10 months later -- but with a more reasonable load of explosives -- in the successful attack against the USS Cole.
Indeed, moderation frequently has been the element that has made the difference between success and failure for al Qaeda operations -- as both the Cole and Sept. 11 examples show. Sometimes, smaller is simply better. It is, for example, much easier to keep operational security intact when only a few operatives are brought into a plan. With every person who is brought in on a secret, the risks of detection or infiltration of a cell increase. Given the large number of arrests that have been made in the U.K. case, and the fact that authorities believe as many as 50 people perhaps were involved in the plot, it is not surprising that operational security was compromised.
The Key Questions
In view of this history, there loom at least two important questions. First, was al Qaeda's top leadership aware of details of the U.K. plot? And if so, why was the principle of moderation not applied?We cannot fully know what was in the minds of bin Laden and al-Zawahiri, of course, but recent events seem to provide some important clues.
It has been noted that al Qaeda leaders have put out a record number of personal recordings so far this year -- many of them threatening strikes against the United States and the United Kingdom.
One particularly interesting video, featuring al-Zawahiri, was released July 27.
In the backdrop hang three large photos: one of Mohammed Atef (al Qaeda's senior military chief, who was killed in Afghanistan in late 2001) on the left, one of Sept. 11 operational commander Mohammed Atta on the right and a photo of the burning World Trade Center towers directly behind al-Zawahiri. In the video, al-Zawahiri discusses a lecture Atef gave in 2000 to al Qaeda trainees about Palestine. According to his recounting, Atta -- who was among the trainees -- asked, "What is the way to defeat the attack on Palestine?" Al-Zawahiri supplied his own answer in the video: He said Americans know the rest of the story, and that the nation that produced the 19 "who shook America" is "capable of producing double that number."
Now, it could be a coincidence that a large plot involving aircraft -- just over twice as many as were hijacked on Sept. 11 -- was thwarted only two weeks after this video was released. But we are not big believers in coincidence. To our minds, the July 27 tape was a clear message, meant to be viewed in retrospect, that al Qaeda was behind the new planes operation. It also stands as a possible example of al Qaeda's adherence to the oft-repeated principle that "he who warns is excused." Extending the forensic analysis, it is interesting to note that the two men shown in the backdrop of the video, Atef and Atta, are both dead. The two other principal planners involved in Sept. 11 attacks, KSM and Ramzi bin al-Shibh, are in U.S. custody.
It is clear that bin Laden and al-Zawahiri are still at least nominally in control at the top of the organization, but surprisingly little is known about the cadre of al Qaeda middle managers -- the men who would plan the tactical details of any attacks. It is possible that the tactical commander, or the "Atta," of the U.K. plot may be in custody, but there remain questions as to who the higher-level managers -- the equivalents of a bin al-Shibh or KSM -- might be.
Given all the KSM-like flourishes of the plot, one wonders whether at least one of the planners had previously worked for KSM or was otherwise strongly influenced by his way of thinking. Someone clearly had a firm grasp of al Qaeda's history of operational planning.
However, it is striking that the planners appear not to have learned from al Qaeda's failures as well. The "think big" principle clearly carried through, but the principle of moderation, which enabled past successes, did not.
Several plausible explanations for this could be speculated: 1. The U.K. plot adhered to the al Qaeda 1.0 operational model: A professional al Qaeda tactical commander was working with an ad hoc group of local militants. Al Qaeda's top leadership knew details of the plot but decided not to rein it in. This scenario suggests either that the apex leaders are sorely missing the expertise that Atef brought to bear, or they saw the need to carry out a fresh, spectacular strike -- despite the known risks -- for other reasons.
It also is quite possible that, as men of faith, al Qaeda leaders believed Allah would bless their efforts and hide the operation from the eyes of the infidels. (This last point is not as strange as it might sound to some; from the "Atta letter" recovered from the Sept. 11 cell, it is clear that operatives prayed repeatedly for their activities to be concealed from the eyes of security forces.)
2. The U.K. plot conformed to an al Qaeda 3.0. model (best exemplified by the July 7, 2005, strikes in London): It was planned by a grassroots organization that had some, but limited, contact with the apex leadership. In this scenario, the apex leadership had an idea that something was coming but lacked either details or else the ability to intervene and pare down the size of the operation. Of course, the top leaders -- now scattered and in hiding -- are under far more pressure than they were prior to Sept. 11. As a matter of survival, they are both much more isolated and, logic dictates, more careful in their communications with the group at large.
But, if this hypothesis is the correct one, there also is a certain brilliance in simplicity: The "go" signal for the operation may have been broadcast to the world at large -- though somewhat masked amid a plethora of other tapes featuring al Qaeda leaders -- without the mission being jeopardized.
3. A hybrid model was used. That is, the U.K. plot represents a grassroots operation that the leadership knew about -- and recognized the risks involved in a plan that called upon such a large number of operatives -- but nevertheless allowed it to proceed. If this was the case, it would indicate that al Qaeda leaders expected the disruption of the U.K. plot itself, but wanted to distract attention from operations elsewhere, perhaps focusing on a different target set.
Parallel Planning
We do not yet possess enough details to give one of these possibilities more weight than the others. However, given al Qaeda's history, it is wise to note here a final tactical trait: The tendency toward parallel planning for multiple, diverse operations.
For instance, Basit and KSM had a host of plots in the works at the time of Basit's accident in Manila, which brought plans for Operation Bojinka and other plots to a halt. (Shortly after fleeing from Manila, Basit continued efforts to implement parts of Bojinka from Thailand and Pakistan). The same tendency toward multitasking also was apparent in the aftermath of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, when Sheikh Omar Abdul-Rahman and a group of his followers were arrested for plotting bombings against a number of New York City landmarks.
Notably, the failure of one part of a multi-pronged attack strategy does not necessarily mean that other prongs are canceled. Consider the "millennium bomb plot," in which three separate operations were proceeding concurrently in different parts of the world and against different target sets: a strike against a Radisson hotel in Amman, Jordan; the attack against the USS The Sullivans off the shore at Aden, and a plot involving Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) in the United States.
The Amman plot was foiled on Dec. 5, 1999, when Jordanian intelligence caught wind of it and arrested the attack team upon their arrival in country. And on Dec. 14, would-be LAX bomber Ahmed Ressam was arrested while crossing the U.S. border from Canada. All the same, preparations for the strike against the USS The Sullivans continued, failing only because of a tactical mistake by the militants as they moved toward the target on Jan. 3, 2000. And despite even that failure, the Aden cell regrouped and carried out a successful strike against the Cole ten months later.
Therefore, while we must believe that al Qaeda suffered a serious breach of operational security and lost one potential operation -- perhaps even an entire node -- this month in the United Kingdom, the group should not be discounted entirely as a tactical threat. Rather, this likely is a time to seek out other operations that may be in the planning stages, perhaps involving other industries and locales. Given al Qaeda's fixation on certain target sets and its tendency to return repeatedly to successful patterns, it is possible that trains and hotels are under heightened threat at this time. With history as a guide, it also is not beyond the realm of possibility that -- as in the Library Tower plot and "shoe-bomb" attempt -- another attack involving aircraft, but employing a fresh tactical approach -- might be attempted.
Send questions or comments on this article to analysis@stratfor.com.
Wrap...
The U.K. Plot: Lessons Not Learned and Risk Implications
By Fred Burton
British authorities have made more than two dozen arrests, mostly of British citizens of Pakistani origin, in and around London and Birmingham since Aug. 10 in connection with a plot involving airliners. Of that group, 24 currently remain in custody; another seven suspects reportedly have been arrested in Pakistan.
Details of the foiled operation -- which would have involved blowing up nine flights bound for New York City, Washington, D.C., and California -- clearly fit al Qaeda's operational and tactical profile on several levels. Specifically, the plan bears several trademarks associated with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM), the captured operational planner who was called "the principal architect of the 9/11 operation" in the 9/11 Commission Report.
These trademarks include the choice of aircraft as a target; the notion of multiple, simultaneous strikes; and the use of modular improvised explosive devices, which would have been smuggled aboard the aircraft in carry-on luggage. Moreover, whoever was involved in planning the U.K. operation shared KSM's penchant for "thinking big."
This yen for the grandiose attack, as opposed to a merely effective one, has at times caused al Qaeda operations to fail -- and perhaps did so here as well. However, in considering this failed operation, it is important to remember another element that has run through al Qaeda's history of operations: a tendency to have multiple attacks in various stages of planning at any given time. It is entirely possible that, as the world focuses on the United Kingdom and international air travel, other plots involving different target sets and other parts of the globe could be in motion.
The KSM Trademarks
The U.K. plot is striking, first, because it hearkens back not only to Sept. 11, but to KSM and his long-running fascination with exploding aircraft. KSM was the principal planner of al Qaeda's "planes operation."
As originally conceived, this plan was to involve the simultaneous hijackings of 10 aircraft, departing from both the east and west coasts of the United States. Nine of the aircraft were to be either blown up in-flight or slammed into targeted buildings. KSM envisioned himself landing the 10th plane at a U.S. airport and (after killing all adult male passengers) delivering a speech outlining al Qaeda's grievances with the United States. Al Qaeda's apex leaders -- Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri and Mohammed Atef -- eventually agreed to a scaled-down version of the planes operation, which was carried out on Sept. 11, 2001.
The west coast portion of the plan was spun off as a separate operation that was to have occurred in October 2001, but which reportedly was postponed several times for various reasons. This operation, also known as the Library Tower Plot, was compromised and disrupted in 2002. KSM also is believed to have been involved in the plot to bomb American Airlines Flight 63 in December 2001. That plan nearly succeeded: Richard Reid successfully smuggled his "shoe bomb" aboard the aircraft. The attempt failed only because Reid tried to light the fuse for his bomb in the passenger cabin (rather than a more secluded area, such as a restroom) and was stopped by a flight attendant and passengers.
The U.K. plot bears perhaps the strongest resemblance, however, to Operation Bojinka, which KSM (along with his nephew, Abdel Basit) helped to plan and finance while living in Manila in the mid-1990s. The tactical similarities here include the use of modular explosive devices, which would have been assembled in-flight after operatives accessed their carry-on baggage, and the use of liquid explosives.
Grand Schemes
The very scope of the U.K. plot also highlights another KSM trait: a tendency to think big. This characteristic was the undoing of several important al Qaeda attacks, such as the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and an attempted strike against the USS The Sullivans, off the coast of Yemen, in January 2000. In the World Trade Center case, a massive truck bomb was built, delivered and detonated -- resulting in six deaths and hundreds of injuries. Because the goal was to topple Tower One into Tower Two and destroy the entire landmark in spectacular fashion, the planners decided to place the truck bomb in the basement parking garage (rather than at street level, where, it turns out, it would have been far more deadly). The robust construction of the buildings withstood the blast.
The attempt to strike The Sullivans with a suicide boat bomber also floundered due to overreach; the militants filled the boat with too many explosives, causing the craft to sink before it could reach the target. Significantly, al Qaeda operatives used the same tactics 10 months later -- but with a more reasonable load of explosives -- in the successful attack against the USS Cole.
Indeed, moderation frequently has been the element that has made the difference between success and failure for al Qaeda operations -- as both the Cole and Sept. 11 examples show. Sometimes, smaller is simply better. It is, for example, much easier to keep operational security intact when only a few operatives are brought into a plan. With every person who is brought in on a secret, the risks of detection or infiltration of a cell increase. Given the large number of arrests that have been made in the U.K. case, and the fact that authorities believe as many as 50 people perhaps were involved in the plot, it is not surprising that operational security was compromised.
The Key Questions
In view of this history, there loom at least two important questions. First, was al Qaeda's top leadership aware of details of the U.K. plot? And if so, why was the principle of moderation not applied?We cannot fully know what was in the minds of bin Laden and al-Zawahiri, of course, but recent events seem to provide some important clues.
It has been noted that al Qaeda leaders have put out a record number of personal recordings so far this year -- many of them threatening strikes against the United States and the United Kingdom.
One particularly interesting video, featuring al-Zawahiri, was released July 27.
In the backdrop hang three large photos: one of Mohammed Atef (al Qaeda's senior military chief, who was killed in Afghanistan in late 2001) on the left, one of Sept. 11 operational commander Mohammed Atta on the right and a photo of the burning World Trade Center towers directly behind al-Zawahiri. In the video, al-Zawahiri discusses a lecture Atef gave in 2000 to al Qaeda trainees about Palestine. According to his recounting, Atta -- who was among the trainees -- asked, "What is the way to defeat the attack on Palestine?" Al-Zawahiri supplied his own answer in the video: He said Americans know the rest of the story, and that the nation that produced the 19 "who shook America" is "capable of producing double that number."
Now, it could be a coincidence that a large plot involving aircraft -- just over twice as many as were hijacked on Sept. 11 -- was thwarted only two weeks after this video was released. But we are not big believers in coincidence. To our minds, the July 27 tape was a clear message, meant to be viewed in retrospect, that al Qaeda was behind the new planes operation. It also stands as a possible example of al Qaeda's adherence to the oft-repeated principle that "he who warns is excused." Extending the forensic analysis, it is interesting to note that the two men shown in the backdrop of the video, Atef and Atta, are both dead. The two other principal planners involved in Sept. 11 attacks, KSM and Ramzi bin al-Shibh, are in U.S. custody.
It is clear that bin Laden and al-Zawahiri are still at least nominally in control at the top of the organization, but surprisingly little is known about the cadre of al Qaeda middle managers -- the men who would plan the tactical details of any attacks. It is possible that the tactical commander, or the "Atta," of the U.K. plot may be in custody, but there remain questions as to who the higher-level managers -- the equivalents of a bin al-Shibh or KSM -- might be.
Given all the KSM-like flourishes of the plot, one wonders whether at least one of the planners had previously worked for KSM or was otherwise strongly influenced by his way of thinking. Someone clearly had a firm grasp of al Qaeda's history of operational planning.
However, it is striking that the planners appear not to have learned from al Qaeda's failures as well. The "think big" principle clearly carried through, but the principle of moderation, which enabled past successes, did not.
Several plausible explanations for this could be speculated: 1. The U.K. plot adhered to the al Qaeda 1.0 operational model: A professional al Qaeda tactical commander was working with an ad hoc group of local militants. Al Qaeda's top leadership knew details of the plot but decided not to rein it in. This scenario suggests either that the apex leaders are sorely missing the expertise that Atef brought to bear, or they saw the need to carry out a fresh, spectacular strike -- despite the known risks -- for other reasons.
It also is quite possible that, as men of faith, al Qaeda leaders believed Allah would bless their efforts and hide the operation from the eyes of the infidels. (This last point is not as strange as it might sound to some; from the "Atta letter" recovered from the Sept. 11 cell, it is clear that operatives prayed repeatedly for their activities to be concealed from the eyes of security forces.)
2. The U.K. plot conformed to an al Qaeda 3.0. model (best exemplified by the July 7, 2005, strikes in London): It was planned by a grassroots organization that had some, but limited, contact with the apex leadership. In this scenario, the apex leadership had an idea that something was coming but lacked either details or else the ability to intervene and pare down the size of the operation. Of course, the top leaders -- now scattered and in hiding -- are under far more pressure than they were prior to Sept. 11. As a matter of survival, they are both much more isolated and, logic dictates, more careful in their communications with the group at large.
But, if this hypothesis is the correct one, there also is a certain brilliance in simplicity: The "go" signal for the operation may have been broadcast to the world at large -- though somewhat masked amid a plethora of other tapes featuring al Qaeda leaders -- without the mission being jeopardized.
3. A hybrid model was used. That is, the U.K. plot represents a grassroots operation that the leadership knew about -- and recognized the risks involved in a plan that called upon such a large number of operatives -- but nevertheless allowed it to proceed. If this was the case, it would indicate that al Qaeda leaders expected the disruption of the U.K. plot itself, but wanted to distract attention from operations elsewhere, perhaps focusing on a different target set.
Parallel Planning
We do not yet possess enough details to give one of these possibilities more weight than the others. However, given al Qaeda's history, it is wise to note here a final tactical trait: The tendency toward parallel planning for multiple, diverse operations.
For instance, Basit and KSM had a host of plots in the works at the time of Basit's accident in Manila, which brought plans for Operation Bojinka and other plots to a halt. (Shortly after fleeing from Manila, Basit continued efforts to implement parts of Bojinka from Thailand and Pakistan). The same tendency toward multitasking also was apparent in the aftermath of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, when Sheikh Omar Abdul-Rahman and a group of his followers were arrested for plotting bombings against a number of New York City landmarks.
Notably, the failure of one part of a multi-pronged attack strategy does not necessarily mean that other prongs are canceled. Consider the "millennium bomb plot," in which three separate operations were proceeding concurrently in different parts of the world and against different target sets: a strike against a Radisson hotel in Amman, Jordan; the attack against the USS The Sullivans off the shore at Aden, and a plot involving Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) in the United States.
The Amman plot was foiled on Dec. 5, 1999, when Jordanian intelligence caught wind of it and arrested the attack team upon their arrival in country. And on Dec. 14, would-be LAX bomber Ahmed Ressam was arrested while crossing the U.S. border from Canada. All the same, preparations for the strike against the USS The Sullivans continued, failing only because of a tactical mistake by the militants as they moved toward the target on Jan. 3, 2000. And despite even that failure, the Aden cell regrouped and carried out a successful strike against the Cole ten months later.
Therefore, while we must believe that al Qaeda suffered a serious breach of operational security and lost one potential operation -- perhaps even an entire node -- this month in the United Kingdom, the group should not be discounted entirely as a tactical threat. Rather, this likely is a time to seek out other operations that may be in the planning stages, perhaps involving other industries and locales. Given al Qaeda's fixation on certain target sets and its tendency to return repeatedly to successful patterns, it is possible that trains and hotels are under heightened threat at this time. With history as a guide, it also is not beyond the realm of possibility that -- as in the Library Tower plot and "shoe-bomb" attempt -- another attack involving aircraft, but employing a fresh tactical approach -- might be attempted.
Send questions or comments on this article to analysis@stratfor.com.
Wrap...
Tuesday, August 15, 2006
Thanx to Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld...
From International Herald Tribune:
Limits of force: The Iraq Syndrome will haunt America
The Iraq Syndrome, similar to the trauma experienced by the United States after Vietnam, is already under way.
Wrap....
Limits of force: The Iraq Syndrome will haunt America
The Iraq Syndrome, similar to the trauma experienced by the United States after Vietnam, is already under way.
Wrap....
Next move for Hezbollah? For Israel?
From Strategic Forecasting, Inc:
Cease-Fire: Shaking Core Beliefs in the Middle East
By George Friedman
An extraordinary thing happened in the Middle East this month. An Israeli army faced an Arab army and did not defeat it -- did not render it incapable of continued resistance. That was the outcome in 1948, 1956, 1967, 1973 and 1982. But it did not happen in 2006. Should this outcome stand, it will represent a geopolitical earthquake in the region -- one that fundamentally shifts expectations and behaviors on all sides. It is not that Hezbollah defeated the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). It did not. By most measures, it got the worst of the battle. Nevertheless, it has been left standing at the end of the battle. Its forces in the Bekaa Valley and in the Beirut area have been battered, though how severely is not yet clear. Its forces south of the Litani River were badly hurt by the Israeli attack. Nevertheless, the correlation of forces was such that the Israelis should have dealt Hezbollah, at least in southern Lebanon, a devastating blow, such that resistance would have crumbled.
IDF did not strike such a blow -- so as the cease-fire took effect, Hezbollah continued to resist, continued to inflict casualties on Israeli troops and continued to fire rockets at Israel. Hezbollah has not been rendered incapable of continued resistance, and that is unprecedented.
In the regional equation, there has been an immutable belief: that, at the end of the day, IDF was capable of imposing a unilateral military solution on any Arab force. Israel might have failed to achieve its political goals in its various wars, but it never failed to impose its will on an enemy force. As a result, all neighboring nations and entities understood there were boundaries that could be crossed only if a country was willing to accept a crushing Israeli response.
All neighboring countries -- Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, prior to the collapses of central authority -- understood this and shaped their behavior in view of it. Even when Egypt and Syria initiated war in 1973, it was with an understanding that their war aims had to be limited, that they had to accept the probability of defeat and had to focus on postwar political maneuvers rather than on expectations of victory.
The Egyptians withdrew from conflict and accepted the Sinai as a buffer zone, largely because 1973 convinced them that continued conflict was futile. Jordan, since 1970, has been effectively under the protection of Israel against threats from Syria and internal dangers as well. Syria has not directly challenged the Israelis since 1973, preferring indirect challenges and, not infrequently, accommodation with Israel.
The idea of Israel as a regional superpower has been the defining principle.
In this conflict, what Hezbollah has achieved is not so much a defeat of Israel as a demonstration that destruction in detail is not an inevitable outcome of challenging Israel. Hezbollah has showed that it is possible to fight to a point that Israel prefers a cease-fire and political settlement to a military victory followed by political accommodation. Israel might not have lost any particular battle, and a careful analysis of the outcome could prove its course to be reasonable. But the loss of the sense -- and historical reality -- of the inevitability of Israeli military victory is a far more profound defeat for Israel, as this clears the way for other regional powers to recalculate risks.
Hezbollah's Preparations
Hezbollah meticulously prepared for the war by analyzing Israeli strengths and weaknesses. Israel is casualty-averse by dint of demographics. It therefore resorts to force multipliers such as air power and armor, combined with excellent reconnaissance and tactical intelligence. Israel uses mobility to cut lines of supply and air power to shatter centralized command-and-control, leaving enemy forces disorganized, unbalanced and unsupplied.
Hezbollah sought to deny Israel its major advantages. The group created a network of fortifications in southern Lebanon that did not require its fighters to maneuver and expose themselves to Israeli air power. Hezbollah stocked those bunkers so fighters could conduct extended combat without the need for resupply. It devolved command to the unit level, making it impossible for a decapitation strike by Israel to affect the battlefield. It worked in such a way that, while the general idea of the defense architecture was understood by Israeli military intelligence, the kind of detailed intelligence used -- for example, in 1967 -- was denied the Israelis.
Hezbollah acquired anti-tank weapons from Syria and Iran that prevented Israeli armor from operating without prior infantry clearing of anti-tank teams. And by doing that, the group forced the Israelis to accept casualties in excess of what could, apparently, be tolerated. In short, it forced the Israelis to fight Hezbollah's type of war, rather than the other way around.
Hezbollah then initiated war at the time and place of its choosing. There has been speculation that Israel planned for such a war. That might be the case, but it is self-evident that, if the Israelis wanted this war, they were not expecting it when it happened. The opening of the war was not marked by the capture of two Israeli soldiers. Rather, it was the persistent and intense bombardment of Israel with missiles -- including attacks against Israel's third-largest city, Haifa -- that compelled the Israelis to fight at a moment when they obviously were unprepared for war, and could not clearly decide either their war aims or strategy.
In short, Hezbollah applied a model that was supposed to be Israel's forte: The group prepared meticulously for a war and launched it when the enemy was unprepared for it. Hezbollah went on the strategic offensive and tactical defensive. It created a situation in which Israeli forces had to move to the operational and tactical offensive at the moment of Hezbollah's highest level of preparedness.
Israel could not decline combat, because of the rocket attacks against Haifa, nor was it really ready for war -- particularly psychologically. The Israelis fought when Hezbollah chose and where Hezbollah chose. Their goals were complex, where Hezbollah's were simple. Israel wanted to stop the rockets, break Hezbollah, suffer minimal casualties and maintain its image as an irresistible military force. Hezbollah merely wanted to survive the Israeli attack. The very complexity of Israel's war aims, hastily crafted as they were, represented a failure point.
The Foundations of Israeli Strategy
It is important to think through the reasoning that led to Israeli operations. Israel's actions were based on a principle promulgated by Ariel Sharon at the time of his leadership. Sharon argued that Israel must erect a wall between Israelis and Arabs. His reasoning stemmed from circumstances he faced during Israel's occupation of Lebanon: Counterinsurgency operations impose an unnecessary and unbearable cost in the long run, particularly when designed to protect peripheral interests. The losses may be small in number but, over the long term, they pose severe operational and morale challenges to the occupying force.
Therefore, for Sharon, the withdrawal from Lebanon in the 1980s created a paradigm. Israel needed a national security policy that avoided the burden of counterinsurgency operations without first requiring a political settlement. In other words, Israel needed to end counterinsurgency operations by unilaterally ending the occupation and erecting a barrier between Israel and hostile populations.
The important concept in Sharon's thinking was not the notion of impenetrable borders. Rather, the important concept was the idea that Israel could not tolerate counterinsurgency operations because it could not tolerate casualties. Sharon certainly did not mean or think that Israel could not tolerate casualties in the event of a total conventional war, as in 1967 or 1973. There, extreme casualties were both tolerable and required. What he meant was that Israel could tolerate any level of casualties in a war of national survival but, paradoxically, could not tolerate low-level casualties in extended wars that did not directly involve Israel's survival.
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert was Sharon's protege. Olmert was struggling with the process of disengagement in Gaza and looking toward the same in the West Bank. Lebanon, where Israel learned the costs of long-term occupation, was the last place he wante d to return to in July 2006. In his view, any operation in Lebanon would be tantamount to a return to counterinsurgency warfare and occupation. He did not recognize early on that Hezbollah was not fighting an insurgency, but rather a conventional war of fixed fortifications.
Olmert did a rational cost-benefit analysis. First, if the principle of the Gaza withdrawal was to be followed, the last place the Israelis wanted to be was in Lebanon. Second, though he recognized that the rocket attacks were intolerable in principle, he also knew that, in point of fact, they were relatively ineffective. The number of casualties they were causing, or were likely to cause, would be much lower than those that would be incurred with an invasion and occupation of Lebanon. Olmert, therefore, sought a low-cost solution to the problem of Hezbollah. IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Dan Halutz offered an attractive alternative. Advocating what air force officers have advocated since the 1930s, Halutz launched an air campaign designed to destroy Hezbollah.
It certainly hurt Hezbollah badly, particularly outside of southern Lebanon, where longer-range rocket launchers were located. However, in the immediate battlefield, limited tactical intelligence and the construction of the bunkers appear to have blunted the air attack. As Israeli troops moved forward across the border, they encountered a well-prepared enemy that undoubtedly was weakened but was not destroyed by the air campaign.
At this point, Olmert had a strategic choice to make. He could mount a multi-divisional invasion of Lebanon, absorb large numbers of casualties and risk being entangled in a new counterinsurgency operation, or he could seek a political settlement. He chose a compromise. After appearing to hesitate, he launched an invasion that seemed to bypass critical Hezbollah positions (isolating them), destroying other positions and then opting for a cease-fire that would transfer responsibility for security to the Lebanese army and a foreign peacekeeping force.
Viewed strictly from the standpoint of cost-benefit analysis, Olmert was probably right. Except that Hezbollah's threat to Israel proper had to be eliminated, Israel had no interests in Lebanon. The cost of destroying Hezbollah's military capability would have been extremely high, since it involved moving into the Bekaa Valley and toward Beirut -- let alone close-quarters infantry combat in the south. And even then, over time, Hezbollah would recover.
Since the threat could be eliminated only at a high cost and only for a certain period of time, the casualties required made no sense.
This analysis, however, excluded the political and psychological consequences of leaving an enemy army undefeated on the battlefield. Again, do not overrate what Hezbollah did: The group did not conduct offensive operations; it was not able to conduct maneuver combat; it did not challenge the Israeli air force in the air. All it did was survive and, at the end of the war, retain its ability to threaten Israel with such casualties that Israel declined extended combat. Hezbollah did not defeat Israel on the battlefield. The group merely prevented Israel from defeating it.
And that outcome marks a political and psychological triumph for Hezbollah and a massive defeat for Israel.
Implications for the Region
Hezbollah has demonstrated that total Arab defeat is not inevitable -- and with this demonstration, Israel has lost its tremendous psychological advantage. If an operational and tactical defensive need not end in defeat, then there is no reason to assume that, at some point, an Arab offensive operation need not end in defeat. And if the outcome can be a stalemate, there is no reason to assume that it cannot be a victory. If all things are possible, then taking risks against Israel becomes rational.
The outcome of this war creates two political crises. In Israel, Olmert's decisions will come under serious attack. However correct his cost-benefit analysis might have been, he will be attacked over the political and psychological outcome. The entire legacy of Ariel Sharon -- the doctrine of disengagement -- will now come under attack. If Israel is thrown into political turmoil and indecision, the outcome on the battlefield will have been compounded politically.
There is now also a crisis in Lebanon and in the Muslim world. In Lebanon, Hezbollah has emerged as a massive political force. Even in the multi-confessional society, Hezbollah will be a decisive factor. Syria, marginalized in the region for quite a while, becomes more viable as Hezbollah's patron. Meanwhile, countries like Jordan and Egypt must reexamine their own assumptions about Israel. And in the larger Muslim world, Hezbollah's victory represents a victory for Iran and the Shia. Hezbollah, a Shiite force, has done what others could not do. This will profoundly effect the Shiite position in Iraq -- where the Shia, having first experienced the limits of American power, are now seeing the expanding boundaries of Iranian power.
We would expect Hezbollah, Syria and Iran to move rapidly to exploit what advantage this has given them, before it dissipates. This will increase pressures not only for Israel, but also for the United States, which is engaged in combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as in a vague confrontation with Iran.
For the Israelis and the Americans, restabilizing their interests will be difficult.
Now, some would argue that Israel's possession of weapons of mass destruction negates the consequences of regional perception of weakness. That might be the case, but the fact is that Israel's possession of such weapons did not prevent attacks in 1973, nor were those weapons usable in this case. Consider the distances involved: Israeli forces have been fighting 10 miles from the border. And if Damascus were to be struck with the wind blowing the wrong way, northern Israel would be fried as well. Israel could undertake a nuclear strike against Iran, but the threat posed by Iran is indirect -- since it is far away -- and would not determine the outcome of any regional encounter. Certainly, the possession of nuclear weapons provides Israel a final line from which to threaten enemies -- but by the time that became necessary, the issue already would have shifted massively against Israel.
Nuclear weapons have not been used since World War II -- in spite of many apparent opportunities to do so -- because, as a weapon, the utility is more apparent than real. Possession of nuclear weapons can help guarantee regime survival, but not, by itself, military success.
As it stands, logic holds that, given the tenuous nature of the cease-fire, casus belli on Israel's part can be found and the war reinitiated. Given the mood in Israel, logic would dictate the fall of Olmert, his replacement by a war coalition and an attempt to change the outcome. But logic has not applied to Israeli thinking during this war. We have been consistently surprised by the choices Israel has made, and it is not clear whether this is simply Olmert's problem or one that has become embedded in Israel.
What is clear is that, if the current outcome stands, it will mean there has been a tremendous earthquake in the Middle East. It is cheap and easy to talk about historic events. But when a reality that has dominated a region for 58 years is shattered, it is historic. Perhaps this paves the way to new wars. Perhaps Olmert's restraint opens the door for some sort of stable peace. But from where we sit, he was sufficiently aggressive to increase hostility toward Israel without being sufficiently decisive to achieve a desired military outcome. Hezbollah and Iran hoped for this outcome, though they did not really expect it. They got it. The question on the table now is what they will do with it.
Send questions or co mments on this article to analysis@stratfor.com.
Wrap...
Cease-Fire: Shaking Core Beliefs in the Middle East
By George Friedman
An extraordinary thing happened in the Middle East this month. An Israeli army faced an Arab army and did not defeat it -- did not render it incapable of continued resistance. That was the outcome in 1948, 1956, 1967, 1973 and 1982. But it did not happen in 2006. Should this outcome stand, it will represent a geopolitical earthquake in the region -- one that fundamentally shifts expectations and behaviors on all sides. It is not that Hezbollah defeated the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). It did not. By most measures, it got the worst of the battle. Nevertheless, it has been left standing at the end of the battle. Its forces in the Bekaa Valley and in the Beirut area have been battered, though how severely is not yet clear. Its forces south of the Litani River were badly hurt by the Israeli attack. Nevertheless, the correlation of forces was such that the Israelis should have dealt Hezbollah, at least in southern Lebanon, a devastating blow, such that resistance would have crumbled.
IDF did not strike such a blow -- so as the cease-fire took effect, Hezbollah continued to resist, continued to inflict casualties on Israeli troops and continued to fire rockets at Israel. Hezbollah has not been rendered incapable of continued resistance, and that is unprecedented.
In the regional equation, there has been an immutable belief: that, at the end of the day, IDF was capable of imposing a unilateral military solution on any Arab force. Israel might have failed to achieve its political goals in its various wars, but it never failed to impose its will on an enemy force. As a result, all neighboring nations and entities understood there were boundaries that could be crossed only if a country was willing to accept a crushing Israeli response.
All neighboring countries -- Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, prior to the collapses of central authority -- understood this and shaped their behavior in view of it. Even when Egypt and Syria initiated war in 1973, it was with an understanding that their war aims had to be limited, that they had to accept the probability of defeat and had to focus on postwar political maneuvers rather than on expectations of victory.
The Egyptians withdrew from conflict and accepted the Sinai as a buffer zone, largely because 1973 convinced them that continued conflict was futile. Jordan, since 1970, has been effectively under the protection of Israel against threats from Syria and internal dangers as well. Syria has not directly challenged the Israelis since 1973, preferring indirect challenges and, not infrequently, accommodation with Israel.
The idea of Israel as a regional superpower has been the defining principle.
In this conflict, what Hezbollah has achieved is not so much a defeat of Israel as a demonstration that destruction in detail is not an inevitable outcome of challenging Israel. Hezbollah has showed that it is possible to fight to a point that Israel prefers a cease-fire and political settlement to a military victory followed by political accommodation. Israel might not have lost any particular battle, and a careful analysis of the outcome could prove its course to be reasonable. But the loss of the sense -- and historical reality -- of the inevitability of Israeli military victory is a far more profound defeat for Israel, as this clears the way for other regional powers to recalculate risks.
Hezbollah's Preparations
Hezbollah meticulously prepared for the war by analyzing Israeli strengths and weaknesses. Israel is casualty-averse by dint of demographics. It therefore resorts to force multipliers such as air power and armor, combined with excellent reconnaissance and tactical intelligence. Israel uses mobility to cut lines of supply and air power to shatter centralized command-and-control, leaving enemy forces disorganized, unbalanced and unsupplied.
Hezbollah sought to deny Israel its major advantages. The group created a network of fortifications in southern Lebanon that did not require its fighters to maneuver and expose themselves to Israeli air power. Hezbollah stocked those bunkers so fighters could conduct extended combat without the need for resupply. It devolved command to the unit level, making it impossible for a decapitation strike by Israel to affect the battlefield. It worked in such a way that, while the general idea of the defense architecture was understood by Israeli military intelligence, the kind of detailed intelligence used -- for example, in 1967 -- was denied the Israelis.
Hezbollah acquired anti-tank weapons from Syria and Iran that prevented Israeli armor from operating without prior infantry clearing of anti-tank teams. And by doing that, the group forced the Israelis to accept casualties in excess of what could, apparently, be tolerated. In short, it forced the Israelis to fight Hezbollah's type of war, rather than the other way around.
Hezbollah then initiated war at the time and place of its choosing. There has been speculation that Israel planned for such a war. That might be the case, but it is self-evident that, if the Israelis wanted this war, they were not expecting it when it happened. The opening of the war was not marked by the capture of two Israeli soldiers. Rather, it was the persistent and intense bombardment of Israel with missiles -- including attacks against Israel's third-largest city, Haifa -- that compelled the Israelis to fight at a moment when they obviously were unprepared for war, and could not clearly decide either their war aims or strategy.
In short, Hezbollah applied a model that was supposed to be Israel's forte: The group prepared meticulously for a war and launched it when the enemy was unprepared for it. Hezbollah went on the strategic offensive and tactical defensive. It created a situation in which Israeli forces had to move to the operational and tactical offensive at the moment of Hezbollah's highest level of preparedness.
Israel could not decline combat, because of the rocket attacks against Haifa, nor was it really ready for war -- particularly psychologically. The Israelis fought when Hezbollah chose and where Hezbollah chose. Their goals were complex, where Hezbollah's were simple. Israel wanted to stop the rockets, break Hezbollah, suffer minimal casualties and maintain its image as an irresistible military force. Hezbollah merely wanted to survive the Israeli attack. The very complexity of Israel's war aims, hastily crafted as they were, represented a failure point.
The Foundations of Israeli Strategy
It is important to think through the reasoning that led to Israeli operations. Israel's actions were based on a principle promulgated by Ariel Sharon at the time of his leadership. Sharon argued that Israel must erect a wall between Israelis and Arabs. His reasoning stemmed from circumstances he faced during Israel's occupation of Lebanon: Counterinsurgency operations impose an unnecessary and unbearable cost in the long run, particularly when designed to protect peripheral interests. The losses may be small in number but, over the long term, they pose severe operational and morale challenges to the occupying force.
Therefore, for Sharon, the withdrawal from Lebanon in the 1980s created a paradigm. Israel needed a national security policy that avoided the burden of counterinsurgency operations without first requiring a political settlement. In other words, Israel needed to end counterinsurgency operations by unilaterally ending the occupation and erecting a barrier between Israel and hostile populations.
The important concept in Sharon's thinking was not the notion of impenetrable borders. Rather, the important concept was the idea that Israel could not tolerate counterinsurgency operations because it could not tolerate casualties. Sharon certainly did not mean or think that Israel could not tolerate casualties in the event of a total conventional war, as in 1967 or 1973. There, extreme casualties were both tolerable and required. What he meant was that Israel could tolerate any level of casualties in a war of national survival but, paradoxically, could not tolerate low-level casualties in extended wars that did not directly involve Israel's survival.
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert was Sharon's protege. Olmert was struggling with the process of disengagement in Gaza and looking toward the same in the West Bank. Lebanon, where Israel learned the costs of long-term occupation, was the last place he wante d to return to in July 2006. In his view, any operation in Lebanon would be tantamount to a return to counterinsurgency warfare and occupation. He did not recognize early on that Hezbollah was not fighting an insurgency, but rather a conventional war of fixed fortifications.
Olmert did a rational cost-benefit analysis. First, if the principle of the Gaza withdrawal was to be followed, the last place the Israelis wanted to be was in Lebanon. Second, though he recognized that the rocket attacks were intolerable in principle, he also knew that, in point of fact, they were relatively ineffective. The number of casualties they were causing, or were likely to cause, would be much lower than those that would be incurred with an invasion and occupation of Lebanon. Olmert, therefore, sought a low-cost solution to the problem of Hezbollah. IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Dan Halutz offered an attractive alternative. Advocating what air force officers have advocated since the 1930s, Halutz launched an air campaign designed to destroy Hezbollah.
It certainly hurt Hezbollah badly, particularly outside of southern Lebanon, where longer-range rocket launchers were located. However, in the immediate battlefield, limited tactical intelligence and the construction of the bunkers appear to have blunted the air attack. As Israeli troops moved forward across the border, they encountered a well-prepared enemy that undoubtedly was weakened but was not destroyed by the air campaign.
At this point, Olmert had a strategic choice to make. He could mount a multi-divisional invasion of Lebanon, absorb large numbers of casualties and risk being entangled in a new counterinsurgency operation, or he could seek a political settlement. He chose a compromise. After appearing to hesitate, he launched an invasion that seemed to bypass critical Hezbollah positions (isolating them), destroying other positions and then opting for a cease-fire that would transfer responsibility for security to the Lebanese army and a foreign peacekeeping force.
Viewed strictly from the standpoint of cost-benefit analysis, Olmert was probably right. Except that Hezbollah's threat to Israel proper had to be eliminated, Israel had no interests in Lebanon. The cost of destroying Hezbollah's military capability would have been extremely high, since it involved moving into the Bekaa Valley and toward Beirut -- let alone close-quarters infantry combat in the south. And even then, over time, Hezbollah would recover.
Since the threat could be eliminated only at a high cost and only for a certain period of time, the casualties required made no sense.
This analysis, however, excluded the political and psychological consequences of leaving an enemy army undefeated on the battlefield. Again, do not overrate what Hezbollah did: The group did not conduct offensive operations; it was not able to conduct maneuver combat; it did not challenge the Israeli air force in the air. All it did was survive and, at the end of the war, retain its ability to threaten Israel with such casualties that Israel declined extended combat. Hezbollah did not defeat Israel on the battlefield. The group merely prevented Israel from defeating it.
And that outcome marks a political and psychological triumph for Hezbollah and a massive defeat for Israel.
Implications for the Region
Hezbollah has demonstrated that total Arab defeat is not inevitable -- and with this demonstration, Israel has lost its tremendous psychological advantage. If an operational and tactical defensive need not end in defeat, then there is no reason to assume that, at some point, an Arab offensive operation need not end in defeat. And if the outcome can be a stalemate, there is no reason to assume that it cannot be a victory. If all things are possible, then taking risks against Israel becomes rational.
The outcome of this war creates two political crises. In Israel, Olmert's decisions will come under serious attack. However correct his cost-benefit analysis might have been, he will be attacked over the political and psychological outcome. The entire legacy of Ariel Sharon -- the doctrine of disengagement -- will now come under attack. If Israel is thrown into political turmoil and indecision, the outcome on the battlefield will have been compounded politically.
There is now also a crisis in Lebanon and in the Muslim world. In Lebanon, Hezbollah has emerged as a massive political force. Even in the multi-confessional society, Hezbollah will be a decisive factor. Syria, marginalized in the region for quite a while, becomes more viable as Hezbollah's patron. Meanwhile, countries like Jordan and Egypt must reexamine their own assumptions about Israel. And in the larger Muslim world, Hezbollah's victory represents a victory for Iran and the Shia. Hezbollah, a Shiite force, has done what others could not do. This will profoundly effect the Shiite position in Iraq -- where the Shia, having first experienced the limits of American power, are now seeing the expanding boundaries of Iranian power.
We would expect Hezbollah, Syria and Iran to move rapidly to exploit what advantage this has given them, before it dissipates. This will increase pressures not only for Israel, but also for the United States, which is engaged in combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as in a vague confrontation with Iran.
For the Israelis and the Americans, restabilizing their interests will be difficult.
Now, some would argue that Israel's possession of weapons of mass destruction negates the consequences of regional perception of weakness. That might be the case, but the fact is that Israel's possession of such weapons did not prevent attacks in 1973, nor were those weapons usable in this case. Consider the distances involved: Israeli forces have been fighting 10 miles from the border. And if Damascus were to be struck with the wind blowing the wrong way, northern Israel would be fried as well. Israel could undertake a nuclear strike against Iran, but the threat posed by Iran is indirect -- since it is far away -- and would not determine the outcome of any regional encounter. Certainly, the possession of nuclear weapons provides Israel a final line from which to threaten enemies -- but by the time that became necessary, the issue already would have shifted massively against Israel.
Nuclear weapons have not been used since World War II -- in spite of many apparent opportunities to do so -- because, as a weapon, the utility is more apparent than real. Possession of nuclear weapons can help guarantee regime survival, but not, by itself, military success.
As it stands, logic holds that, given the tenuous nature of the cease-fire, casus belli on Israel's part can be found and the war reinitiated. Given the mood in Israel, logic would dictate the fall of Olmert, his replacement by a war coalition and an attempt to change the outcome. But logic has not applied to Israeli thinking during this war. We have been consistently surprised by the choices Israel has made, and it is not clear whether this is simply Olmert's problem or one that has become embedded in Israel.
What is clear is that, if the current outcome stands, it will mean there has been a tremendous earthquake in the Middle East. It is cheap and easy to talk about historic events. But when a reality that has dominated a region for 58 years is shattered, it is historic. Perhaps this paves the way to new wars. Perhaps Olmert's restraint opens the door for some sort of stable peace. But from where we sit, he was sufficiently aggressive to increase hostility toward Israel without being sufficiently decisive to achieve a desired military outcome. Hezbollah and Iran hoped for this outcome, though they did not really expect it. They got it. The question on the table now is what they will do with it.
Send questions or co mments on this article to analysis@stratfor.com.
Wrap...
Monday, August 14, 2006
It's classified...take it off your website!!!
From Secrecy Report:
MANPADS REPORT WITHDRAWN FROM FAS WEB SITE
A July 31 Department of Homeland Security report to Congress on the status of defenses against shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles was removed from the Federation of American Scientists web site after DHS objected to its publication.
DHS urged that the unclassified report, marked "For Official Use Only," be taken offline and, upon consideration, we agreed to do so.
"The Report has never been released by DHS to the public because it contains sensitive information such as the transition of military technology for potential civil use, systems performance of the prototype systems being developed by DHS and its partners, and the reliability of such prototype systems," wrote DHS deputy associate general counsel William H. Anderson.
"Due to the sensitive nature of the Report, I request that your organization immediately remove the Report from its website.""If the Report is not removed from your website within 2 business days, we will consider further appropriate actions necessary to protect the information contained in the Report," Mr. Anderson wrote.
See his August 9 letter here:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2006/08/dhs080906.pdf
"You took it offline? I'm surprised," said one Congressional staffer who obtained the DHS report to Congress via FAS. He said that executive branch restrictions on unclassified information had become a growing hindrance to Congressional oversight. If the document is really sensitive, he suggested, "it should be classified."
Our intention is to review the document in light of the concerns expressed by DHS. Following such review, the document or portions of it may be restored to our web site.
Wrap...
MANPADS REPORT WITHDRAWN FROM FAS WEB SITE
A July 31 Department of Homeland Security report to Congress on the status of defenses against shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles was removed from the Federation of American Scientists web site after DHS objected to its publication.
DHS urged that the unclassified report, marked "For Official Use Only," be taken offline and, upon consideration, we agreed to do so.
"The Report has never been released by DHS to the public because it contains sensitive information such as the transition of military technology for potential civil use, systems performance of the prototype systems being developed by DHS and its partners, and the reliability of such prototype systems," wrote DHS deputy associate general counsel William H. Anderson.
"Due to the sensitive nature of the Report, I request that your organization immediately remove the Report from its website.""If the Report is not removed from your website within 2 business days, we will consider further appropriate actions necessary to protect the information contained in the Report," Mr. Anderson wrote.
See his August 9 letter here:
http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2006/08/dhs080906.pdf
"You took it offline? I'm surprised," said one Congressional staffer who obtained the DHS report to Congress via FAS. He said that executive branch restrictions on unclassified information had become a growing hindrance to Congressional oversight. If the document is really sensitive, he suggested, "it should be classified."
Our intention is to review the document in light of the concerns expressed by DHS. Following such review, the document or portions of it may be restored to our web site.
Wrap...
Iranian Prez has a blog!
From BBC:
Iran's president launches weblog Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has joined a burgeoning international community - by starting his own weblog.
The launch of www.ahmadinejad.ir was reported on state TV, which urged users to send in messages to the president.
Mr Ahmadinejad's first posting, entitled autobiography, tells of his childhood, Iran's Islamic revolution, and the country's war with Iraq.
The blog includes a poll asking if users think the US and Israel are trying to trigger a new world war.
There is a postform for users to send in questions for the president, and a picture gallery containing a series of images of the blogger himself.
The move by Mr Ahmadinejad comes amid continuing internet censorship by the Iranian government.
With hope in God, I intend to wholeheartedly complete my talk in future with allotted 15 minutes Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's blog
In a country where the media is strictly controlled, the internet has become the main forum for dissident voices.
But in its bid to crack down on anti-government bloggers, the government uses one of the most sophisticated internet censorship systems in the world.
Such restrictions will not pose a problem for the president. However, at the end of his first posting - which runs to more than 2,000 words in English - he promises to try to keep things "shorter and simpler" in future.
"With hope in God, I intend to wholeheartedly complete my talk in future with allotted 15 minutes," he writes.
Nose bleed
Mr Ahmadinejad's first entry on his blog, which is available in Persian, Arabic, English and French and includes an RSS feed to get future new entries to readers, is dated Friday.
He begins by telling users of his humble origins. "During the era that nobility was a prestige and living in a city was perfection, I was born in a poor family in a remote village of Garmsar - approximately 90 kilometres west of Tehran," he writes.
His father was a "hard-bitten toiler blacksmith" and a "pious man", who had decided to move the family to Tehran when Mr Ahmadinejad was just a year old.
Describing himself as a "distinguished student", the president tells how he excelled at school, coming 132nd out of more than 400,000 students to take a university entrance test - despite suffering from a nose bleed at the time.
He talks about his admiration and affection for the leader of the Islamic revolution Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and discusses Iran's war with Iraq, calling former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein an "aggressor" who was "intoxicated with power".
The US is also heavily criticised by the president. At one point he describes it as "Great Satan USA" for what he says was its support for the "terrorist groups" which had tried to collapse Iran's Islamic government.
And the blog's current poll asks the question: "Do you think that the US and Israeli intention and goal by attacking Lebanon is pulling the trigger for another world war?"
'Publicity stunt'
It is not yet clear how well Mr Ahmadinejad's blog will be received. User figures already appear high - by 1100 BST on Monday, nearly 12,000 people had taken part in the online vote.
But Keivan Mehrgan, a Tehran-based blogger, told the Associated Press news agency he thought the president's efforts were merely a publicity stunt.
"Ahmadinejad used to have nothing to do with the internet and even talked against journalists and bloggers before he became president," he was quoted as saying.
Meanwhile, in a move some suggest is part of the same search for a wider international audience, President Ahmadninejad also gave a rare interview to American television.
In extracts broadcast by the BBC on Monday, Mr Ahmadinejad condemned President Bush for wanting to solve the world's problems by force, and for "blindly supporting" Israel in its conflict with Hezbollah.
He also flatly denied Iran was seeking nuclear weapons.
"We want to have access to nuclear technology. We want to produce fuel," he said.
"Do you not think that the most important issue of the world of tomorrow will be energy? We think that Mr Bush's team and the parties that support him want to monopolise energy resources in the world."
The BBC's Bridget Kendall, at the United Nations, says Mr Ahmadinejad's decision to reach out to speak America at this moment - in the wake of the Lebanon conflict - was no accident.
President Ahmadinejad wanted to play on all the doubts about American foreign policy, and counter the notion that Iran is run by mad mullahs trying to get nuclear weapons, our correspondent says.
Story from BBC NEWS:http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/middle_east/4790005.stmPublished: 2006/08/14 23:34:58 GMT© BBC MMVI
Wrap...
Iran's president launches weblog Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has joined a burgeoning international community - by starting his own weblog.
The launch of www.ahmadinejad.ir was reported on state TV, which urged users to send in messages to the president.
Mr Ahmadinejad's first posting, entitled autobiography, tells of his childhood, Iran's Islamic revolution, and the country's war with Iraq.
The blog includes a poll asking if users think the US and Israel are trying to trigger a new world war.
There is a postform for users to send in questions for the president, and a picture gallery containing a series of images of the blogger himself.
The move by Mr Ahmadinejad comes amid continuing internet censorship by the Iranian government.
With hope in God, I intend to wholeheartedly complete my talk in future with allotted 15 minutes Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's blog
In a country where the media is strictly controlled, the internet has become the main forum for dissident voices.
But in its bid to crack down on anti-government bloggers, the government uses one of the most sophisticated internet censorship systems in the world.
Such restrictions will not pose a problem for the president. However, at the end of his first posting - which runs to more than 2,000 words in English - he promises to try to keep things "shorter and simpler" in future.
"With hope in God, I intend to wholeheartedly complete my talk in future with allotted 15 minutes," he writes.
Nose bleed
Mr Ahmadinejad's first entry on his blog, which is available in Persian, Arabic, English and French and includes an RSS feed to get future new entries to readers, is dated Friday.
He begins by telling users of his humble origins. "During the era that nobility was a prestige and living in a city was perfection, I was born in a poor family in a remote village of Garmsar - approximately 90 kilometres west of Tehran," he writes.
His father was a "hard-bitten toiler blacksmith" and a "pious man", who had decided to move the family to Tehran when Mr Ahmadinejad was just a year old.
Describing himself as a "distinguished student", the president tells how he excelled at school, coming 132nd out of more than 400,000 students to take a university entrance test - despite suffering from a nose bleed at the time.
He talks about his admiration and affection for the leader of the Islamic revolution Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and discusses Iran's war with Iraq, calling former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein an "aggressor" who was "intoxicated with power".
The US is also heavily criticised by the president. At one point he describes it as "Great Satan USA" for what he says was its support for the "terrorist groups" which had tried to collapse Iran's Islamic government.
And the blog's current poll asks the question: "Do you think that the US and Israeli intention and goal by attacking Lebanon is pulling the trigger for another world war?"
'Publicity stunt'
It is not yet clear how well Mr Ahmadinejad's blog will be received. User figures already appear high - by 1100 BST on Monday, nearly 12,000 people had taken part in the online vote.
But Keivan Mehrgan, a Tehran-based blogger, told the Associated Press news agency he thought the president's efforts were merely a publicity stunt.
"Ahmadinejad used to have nothing to do with the internet and even talked against journalists and bloggers before he became president," he was quoted as saying.
Meanwhile, in a move some suggest is part of the same search for a wider international audience, President Ahmadninejad also gave a rare interview to American television.
In extracts broadcast by the BBC on Monday, Mr Ahmadinejad condemned President Bush for wanting to solve the world's problems by force, and for "blindly supporting" Israel in its conflict with Hezbollah.
He also flatly denied Iran was seeking nuclear weapons.
"We want to have access to nuclear technology. We want to produce fuel," he said.
"Do you not think that the most important issue of the world of tomorrow will be energy? We think that Mr Bush's team and the parties that support him want to monopolise energy resources in the world."
The BBC's Bridget Kendall, at the United Nations, says Mr Ahmadinejad's decision to reach out to speak America at this moment - in the wake of the Lebanon conflict - was no accident.
President Ahmadinejad wanted to play on all the doubts about American foreign policy, and counter the notion that Iran is run by mad mullahs trying to get nuclear weapons, our correspondent says.
Story from BBC NEWS:http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/middle_east/4790005.stmPublished: 2006/08/14 23:34:58 GMT© BBC MMVI
Wrap...
Sunday, August 13, 2006
Senator Edward Kennedy on VP Cheney's threats...
From the Hartford Courant:
Demeaning Democracy Cheney Paints Lamont Victory As Helping Terrorists
August 13, 2006
By Edward M. Kennedy
Vice presidents are notorious for serving as an administration's chief attack dog, and time and again Dick Cheney has been unleashed to accuse anyone who is opposed to the Bush administration of aiding the terrorists. But this time he has gone too far.The comments he made on the result of the Connecticut Democratic primary - that it might encourage "the al-Qaida types" who want to "break the will of the American people in terms of our ability to stay in the fight and complete the task" - are an attack not just on Democrats, but on democracy itself.
What happened in Connecticut is in fact a model for democracies everywhere. The people of the state heard a vigorous debate between two competing visions of how to protect this country. Young citizens became deeply involved, and turnout was high. The primary reminded us of the miracle of our democracy, in which the nation is ruled by its people - not by any entrenched set of leaders. There are few better messages we could send the world in these troubled times.
Cheney's comments about the election were ugly and frightening. They show once again that he and his party will stop at nothing to wrap Republicans in the flag and to insinuate that anyone who votes against them is giving aid and comfort to the terrorists. It's obvious that this administration lacks basic respect for our fundamental freedoms.
Cheney and his crowd are all for free and open elections - as long as they turn out their way. They are all for free speech - provided it supports the administration. They are all for the rule of law - as long as the law does not prevent them from doing whatever they want to do. When elections, speeches or laws are inconvenient, he does not hesitate to declare that they are helping the terrorists. I can think of no graver offense against our democracy.
Ned Lamont's victory in Connecticut scares Cheney for one simple reason: It demonstrates that a free and independent people can and do hold public officials accountable for their words and deeds.
If the terrorists are indeed paying any attention to the Connecticut primary results, they must be worried.
The people of Connecticut spoke out loud and clear in favor of change. Ned Lamont will stand strong for the people of Connecticut, and put tough and smart foreign policies ahead of the politics of fear and more "stay the course" failures.
Republicans will stop at nothing to make sure that the November elections are not a referendum on their misguided policy in Iraq or on the way they have run our country for the past six years. Unfortunately, this time the facts are getting in their way.
The American people are ready to change an administration that let Osama bin Laden escape.
They are ready to change a Congress that let precious years go by without demanding the implementation of the recommendations of the bipartisan 9/11 Commission to keep us safe.
They are ready to change a policy on Iraq that has drained our resources, weakened our security, stretched our troops and recruited new terrorists.
The November election will teach Dick Cheney and others of his ilk that they cannot use fear to cling to power. As Will Rogers said, "It's no disgrace not to be able to run a country nowadays, but it is a disgrace to keep on trying when you know you can't."
Edward M. Kennedy is a U.S. senator from Massachusetts.
Wrap...
Demeaning Democracy Cheney Paints Lamont Victory As Helping Terrorists
August 13, 2006
By Edward M. Kennedy
Vice presidents are notorious for serving as an administration's chief attack dog, and time and again Dick Cheney has been unleashed to accuse anyone who is opposed to the Bush administration of aiding the terrorists. But this time he has gone too far.The comments he made on the result of the Connecticut Democratic primary - that it might encourage "the al-Qaida types" who want to "break the will of the American people in terms of our ability to stay in the fight and complete the task" - are an attack not just on Democrats, but on democracy itself.
What happened in Connecticut is in fact a model for democracies everywhere. The people of the state heard a vigorous debate between two competing visions of how to protect this country. Young citizens became deeply involved, and turnout was high. The primary reminded us of the miracle of our democracy, in which the nation is ruled by its people - not by any entrenched set of leaders. There are few better messages we could send the world in these troubled times.
Cheney's comments about the election were ugly and frightening. They show once again that he and his party will stop at nothing to wrap Republicans in the flag and to insinuate that anyone who votes against them is giving aid and comfort to the terrorists. It's obvious that this administration lacks basic respect for our fundamental freedoms.
Cheney and his crowd are all for free and open elections - as long as they turn out their way. They are all for free speech - provided it supports the administration. They are all for the rule of law - as long as the law does not prevent them from doing whatever they want to do. When elections, speeches or laws are inconvenient, he does not hesitate to declare that they are helping the terrorists. I can think of no graver offense against our democracy.
Ned Lamont's victory in Connecticut scares Cheney for one simple reason: It demonstrates that a free and independent people can and do hold public officials accountable for their words and deeds.
If the terrorists are indeed paying any attention to the Connecticut primary results, they must be worried.
The people of Connecticut spoke out loud and clear in favor of change. Ned Lamont will stand strong for the people of Connecticut, and put tough and smart foreign policies ahead of the politics of fear and more "stay the course" failures.
Republicans will stop at nothing to make sure that the November elections are not a referendum on their misguided policy in Iraq or on the way they have run our country for the past six years. Unfortunately, this time the facts are getting in their way.
The American people are ready to change an administration that let Osama bin Laden escape.
They are ready to change a Congress that let precious years go by without demanding the implementation of the recommendations of the bipartisan 9/11 Commission to keep us safe.
They are ready to change a policy on Iraq that has drained our resources, weakened our security, stretched our troops and recruited new terrorists.
The November election will teach Dick Cheney and others of his ilk that they cannot use fear to cling to power. As Will Rogers said, "It's no disgrace not to be able to run a country nowadays, but it is a disgrace to keep on trying when you know you can't."
Edward M. Kennedy is a U.S. senator from Massachusetts.
Wrap...
Free Speech? Not in the USA.....
From Observer.Guardian.uk :
The land of the free - but free speech is a rare commodity You can say what you like in the US, just as long as you don't ask awkward questions about America's role in the Middle East
Henry Porter
Sunday August 13, 2006
The Observer
It used to be said that academic rows were vicious because the stakes were so small. That's no longer true in America, where a battle is underway on campuses over what can be said about the Middle East and US foreign policy.
Douglas Giles is a recent casualty. He used to teach a class on world religions at Roosevelt University, Chicago, founded in memory of FDR and his liberal-inclined wife, Eleanor. Last year, Giles was ordered by his head of department, art historian Susan Weininger, not to allow students to ask questions about Palestine and Israel; in fact, nothing was to be mentioned in class, textbooks and examinations that could possibly open Judaism to criticism.
Students, being what they are, did not go along with the ban. A young woman, originally from Pakistan, asked a question about Palestinian rights. Someone complained and Professor Giles was promptly fired.
Leaving aside his boss's doubtful qualifications to set limits on a class of comparative religion - her speciality is early 20th-century Midwestern artists such as Tunis Ponsen (nor have I) - the point to grasp is that Professor Giles did not make inflammatory statements himself: he merely refused to limit debate among the young minds in front of him.
This might be seen as a troubling one-off like the story involving the president of Harvard, Lawrence Summers, who suggested that innate differences between the minds of men and women could be one reason why fewer women succeed in science and maths careers and was then ousted. But Giles's sacking is far more important because it is part of the movement to suppress criticism of Israel on the grounds that it is anti-semitic. A mild man, Giles seems astonished to find the battle for free speech in his own lecture theatre.
'It may be sexy to get on a bus and go to DC and march against war,' he said to me last week. 'It is much less sexy to fight in your own university for the right of free speech. But that is where it begins. That is because they are taking away what you can talk about.' He feels there is a pattern of intolerance in his sacking that has been encouraged by websites such as FrontPageMag.com and Campus Watch.
Joel Beinin of Stanford University is regularly attacked by both. Beinin is a Jew who speaks both Hebrew and Arabic. He worked in Israel and on an assembly line in the US, where he helped Arab workers understand their rights. Now, he holds seminars at Stanford in which all views are expressed. For this reason, no doubt, his photograph recently appeared on the front of a booklet entitled 'Campus Support for Terrorism'.
It was published by David Horovitz, the founder of FrontPageMag.com who has both composed a bill of rights for universities, designed to take politics (for which read liberal influence and plurality) out of the curriculum and a list of the 100 most dangerous academics in America, which includes Noam Chomsky and many other distinguished thinkers and teachers.
The demented, bullying tone of the websites is another symptom of the descent of public discourse in America and, frankly, one can easily see the attractions of self-censorship on the question of Middle East and Israel. Read David Horovitz for longer than five minutes and you begin to hear Senator Joseph McCarthy accusing someone of un-American activities.
At Harvard, a few weeks after what was called Summers's 'mis-step', a much greater row ensued when John Mearsheimer of the University of Chicago and Stephen Walt of Harvard published a paper called 'The Israel Lobby'. Brave because the alleged distortion of US pro-Israel foreign policy is unmentionable in American public life.
Their paper was printed only in the UK, in the London Review of Books. In America, there then followed what has been described as the massive 'Shhhhhhhhh!' Apart from the mud-slinging from sites such as Campus Watch and FrontPageMag, it has had little mainstream circulation and there has been no real debate.
I have read it several times and cannot disagree with an early point made by the authors. 'There is a strong moral case for supporting Israel's existence, but that is not in jeopardy. Viewed objectively, its past and present conduct offers no moral basis for privileging it over the Palestinians.' That is the crux. All Americans, to say little of the British who have been reluctantly welded to US policy, surely deserve the chance to know about the influence that lobbies such as the American-Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) exert at times like these.
'The bottom line,' say Mearsheimer and Walt, 'is that AIPAC is a de facto agent for a foreign government, has a stranglehold on Congress, with the result that US policy is not debated there, even though the policy has important consequences for the entire world. In other words, one of the three main branches of the government is firmly committed to supporting Israel.'
Later they say: 'The lobby's influence causes trouble on several fronts. It increases the terrorist danger that all states face, including America's European allies. It has made it impossible to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a situation that gives extremists a powerful recruiting tool, increases the pool of potential terrorist and sympathisers and contributes to Islamic radicalism in Europe and Asia.'
You could add that the lobby's influence may, in the long run, be very much against Israel's interests.
That is my belief, but these things are rarely discussed in America. People look vaguely queasy when you raise the subject of the Israeli lobby, as though the only concern in American discourse is not to appear anti-semitic, a fear which, I suggest, is sometimes shamelessly played upon.
The right of people like Mearsheimer, Walt, Beinin, Giles and even Summers to say what they think must remain inviolate if we are not to lose the values the West insists its fighting for. A little boldness is called for on both sides of the Atlantic to question the pressure coming from both Jewish and Muslim quarters not to discuss issues openly because of various sensibilities.
In Britain, we should deplore with equal vehemence the temptation to give into special pleading from, for instance, the Muslim businessmen who do not want the film of Monica Ali's Brick Lane made in their area. They have no right to dictate to this ancient democracy of ours - now theirs - and so stifle free expression.
Last week, during Jon Snow's fascinating Channel 4 documentary about Muslim attitudes in this country, a woman said that British society was too decadent for her to allow her children to integrate completely. A moment's thought suggested that British democracy had much to offer over the appalling civic values found in most Muslim countries, the oppression of women in Islam, the untold domestic abuse and the tens of thousands of children sold into bonded labour in Pakistan - her husband's country of origin. Her prim separatism fails to grasp the value of our democratic institutions when set against societies run by Sharia law and so undermines them.
My view is that in America and Britain, we should think of free speech as an article of faith, as one of the ways that we define our civilisation against the forces that were to be unleashed on us this week, as well as the influences that stifle criticism of Israel and so enable the disgraceful actions in south Lebanon.
The interests of extreme proponents of Muslim and Jewish faiths combine in one way or another to assault our ancient democratic traditions and we must resist them.
Let the students like those in Douglas Giles's class ask whatever they like.
Wrap...
The land of the free - but free speech is a rare commodity You can say what you like in the US, just as long as you don't ask awkward questions about America's role in the Middle East
Henry Porter
Sunday August 13, 2006
The Observer
It used to be said that academic rows were vicious because the stakes were so small. That's no longer true in America, where a battle is underway on campuses over what can be said about the Middle East and US foreign policy.
Douglas Giles is a recent casualty. He used to teach a class on world religions at Roosevelt University, Chicago, founded in memory of FDR and his liberal-inclined wife, Eleanor. Last year, Giles was ordered by his head of department, art historian Susan Weininger, not to allow students to ask questions about Palestine and Israel; in fact, nothing was to be mentioned in class, textbooks and examinations that could possibly open Judaism to criticism.
Students, being what they are, did not go along with the ban. A young woman, originally from Pakistan, asked a question about Palestinian rights. Someone complained and Professor Giles was promptly fired.
Leaving aside his boss's doubtful qualifications to set limits on a class of comparative religion - her speciality is early 20th-century Midwestern artists such as Tunis Ponsen (nor have I) - the point to grasp is that Professor Giles did not make inflammatory statements himself: he merely refused to limit debate among the young minds in front of him.
This might be seen as a troubling one-off like the story involving the president of Harvard, Lawrence Summers, who suggested that innate differences between the minds of men and women could be one reason why fewer women succeed in science and maths careers and was then ousted. But Giles's sacking is far more important because it is part of the movement to suppress criticism of Israel on the grounds that it is anti-semitic. A mild man, Giles seems astonished to find the battle for free speech in his own lecture theatre.
'It may be sexy to get on a bus and go to DC and march against war,' he said to me last week. 'It is much less sexy to fight in your own university for the right of free speech. But that is where it begins. That is because they are taking away what you can talk about.' He feels there is a pattern of intolerance in his sacking that has been encouraged by websites such as FrontPageMag.com and Campus Watch.
Joel Beinin of Stanford University is regularly attacked by both. Beinin is a Jew who speaks both Hebrew and Arabic. He worked in Israel and on an assembly line in the US, where he helped Arab workers understand their rights. Now, he holds seminars at Stanford in which all views are expressed. For this reason, no doubt, his photograph recently appeared on the front of a booklet entitled 'Campus Support for Terrorism'.
It was published by David Horovitz, the founder of FrontPageMag.com who has both composed a bill of rights for universities, designed to take politics (for which read liberal influence and plurality) out of the curriculum and a list of the 100 most dangerous academics in America, which includes Noam Chomsky and many other distinguished thinkers and teachers.
The demented, bullying tone of the websites is another symptom of the descent of public discourse in America and, frankly, one can easily see the attractions of self-censorship on the question of Middle East and Israel. Read David Horovitz for longer than five minutes and you begin to hear Senator Joseph McCarthy accusing someone of un-American activities.
At Harvard, a few weeks after what was called Summers's 'mis-step', a much greater row ensued when John Mearsheimer of the University of Chicago and Stephen Walt of Harvard published a paper called 'The Israel Lobby'. Brave because the alleged distortion of US pro-Israel foreign policy is unmentionable in American public life.
Their paper was printed only in the UK, in the London Review of Books. In America, there then followed what has been described as the massive 'Shhhhhhhhh!' Apart from the mud-slinging from sites such as Campus Watch and FrontPageMag, it has had little mainstream circulation and there has been no real debate.
I have read it several times and cannot disagree with an early point made by the authors. 'There is a strong moral case for supporting Israel's existence, but that is not in jeopardy. Viewed objectively, its past and present conduct offers no moral basis for privileging it over the Palestinians.' That is the crux. All Americans, to say little of the British who have been reluctantly welded to US policy, surely deserve the chance to know about the influence that lobbies such as the American-Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) exert at times like these.
'The bottom line,' say Mearsheimer and Walt, 'is that AIPAC is a de facto agent for a foreign government, has a stranglehold on Congress, with the result that US policy is not debated there, even though the policy has important consequences for the entire world. In other words, one of the three main branches of the government is firmly committed to supporting Israel.'
Later they say: 'The lobby's influence causes trouble on several fronts. It increases the terrorist danger that all states face, including America's European allies. It has made it impossible to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a situation that gives extremists a powerful recruiting tool, increases the pool of potential terrorist and sympathisers and contributes to Islamic radicalism in Europe and Asia.'
You could add that the lobby's influence may, in the long run, be very much against Israel's interests.
That is my belief, but these things are rarely discussed in America. People look vaguely queasy when you raise the subject of the Israeli lobby, as though the only concern in American discourse is not to appear anti-semitic, a fear which, I suggest, is sometimes shamelessly played upon.
The right of people like Mearsheimer, Walt, Beinin, Giles and even Summers to say what they think must remain inviolate if we are not to lose the values the West insists its fighting for. A little boldness is called for on both sides of the Atlantic to question the pressure coming from both Jewish and Muslim quarters not to discuss issues openly because of various sensibilities.
In Britain, we should deplore with equal vehemence the temptation to give into special pleading from, for instance, the Muslim businessmen who do not want the film of Monica Ali's Brick Lane made in their area. They have no right to dictate to this ancient democracy of ours - now theirs - and so stifle free expression.
Last week, during Jon Snow's fascinating Channel 4 documentary about Muslim attitudes in this country, a woman said that British society was too decadent for her to allow her children to integrate completely. A moment's thought suggested that British democracy had much to offer over the appalling civic values found in most Muslim countries, the oppression of women in Islam, the untold domestic abuse and the tens of thousands of children sold into bonded labour in Pakistan - her husband's country of origin. Her prim separatism fails to grasp the value of our democratic institutions when set against societies run by Sharia law and so undermines them.
My view is that in America and Britain, we should think of free speech as an article of faith, as one of the ways that we define our civilisation against the forces that were to be unleashed on us this week, as well as the influences that stifle criticism of Israel and so enable the disgraceful actions in south Lebanon.
The interests of extreme proponents of Muslim and Jewish faiths combine in one way or another to assault our ancient democratic traditions and we must resist them.
Let the students like those in Douglas Giles's class ask whatever they like.
Wrap...
Israel..Lebanon...on to Iran....
From truthout.org :
[an excerpt from article]
http://www.truthout.org/docs_2006/081306Y.shtml
"... In the early discussions with American officials, I was told by the Middle East expert and the government consultant, the Israelis repeatedly pointed to the war in Kosovo as an example of what Israel would try to achieve. The NATO forces commanded by U.S. Army General Wesley Clark methodically bombed and strafed not only military targets but tunnels, bridges, and roads, in Kosovo and elsewhere in Serbia, for seventy-eight days before forcing Serbian forces to withdraw from Kosovo. "Israel studied the Kosovo war as its role model," the government consultant said. "The Israelis told Condi Rice, 'You did it in about seventy days, but we need half of that - thirty-five days.' "
There are, of course, vast differences between Lebanon and Kosovo. Clark, who retired from the military in 2000 and unsuccessfully ran as a Democrat for the Presidency in 2004, took issue with the analogy: "If it's true that the Israeli campaign is based on the American approach in Kosovo, then it missed the point. Ours was to use force to obtain a diplomatic objective - it was not about killing people." Clark noted in a 2001 book, "Waging Modern War," that it was the threat of a possible ground invasion as well as the bombing that forced the Serbs to end the war. He told me, "In my experience, air campaigns have to be backed, ultimately, by the will and capability to finish the job on the ground."
Kosovo has been cited publicly by Israeli officials and journalists since the war began. On August 6th, Prime Minister Olmert, responding to European condemnation of the deaths of Lebanese civilians, said, "Where do they get the right to preach to Israel? European countries attacked Kosovo and killed ten thousand civilians. Ten thousand! And none of these countries had to suffer before that from a single rocket. I'm not saying it was wrong to intervene in Kosovo. But please: don't preach to us about the treatment of civilians." (Human Rights Watch estimated the number of civilians killed in the NATO bombing to be five hundred; the Yugoslav government put the number between twelve hundred and five thousand.)
Cheney's office supported the Israeli plan, as did Elliott Abrams, a deputy national-security adviser, according to several former and current officials. (A spokesman for the N.S.C. denied that Abrams had done so.) They believed that Israel should move quickly in its air war against Hezbollah. A former intelligence officer said, "We told Israel, 'Look, if you guys have to go, we're behind you all the way. But we think it should be sooner rather than later - the longer you wait, the less time we have to evaluate and plan for Iran before Bush gets out of office.' "
Cheney's point, the former senior intelligence official said, was "What if the Israelis execute their part of this first, and it's really successful? It'd be great. We can learn what to do in Iran by watching what the Israelis do in Lebanon."
The Pentagon consultant told me that intelligence about Hezbollah and Iran is being mishandled by the White House the same way intelligence had been when, in 2002 and early 2003, the Administration was making the case that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. "The big complaint now in the intelligence community is that all of the important stuff is being sent directly to the top - at the insistence of the White House - and not being analyzed at all, or scarcely," he said. "It's an awful policy and violates all of the N.S.A.'s strictures, and if you complain about it you're out," he said. "Cheney had a strong hand in this."
The long-term Administration goal was to help set up a Sunni Arab coalition - including countries like Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt - that would join the United States and Europe to pressure the ruling Shiite mullahs in Iran. "But the thought behind that plan was that Israel would defeat Hezbollah, not lose to it," the consultant with close ties to Israel said. Some officials in Cheney's office and at the N.S.C. had become convinced, on the basis of private talks, that those nations would moderate their public criticism of Israel and blame Hezbollah for creating the crisis that led to war. Although they did so at first, they shifted their position in the wake of public protests in their countries about the Israeli bombing. The White House was clearly disappointed when, late last month, Prince Saud al-Faisal, the Saudi foreign minister, came to Washington and, at a meeting with Bush, called for the President to intervene immediately to end the war. The Washington Post reported that Washington had hoped to enlist moderate Arab states "in an effort to pressure Syria and Iran to rein in Hezbollah, but the Saudi move . . . seemed to cloud that initiative."
The surprising strength of Hezbollah's resistance, and its continuing ability to fire rockets into northern Israel in the face of the constant Israeli bombing, the Middle East expert told me, "is a massive setback for those in the White House who want to use force in Iran. And those who argue that the bombing will create internal dissent and revolt in Iran are also set back."
Nonetheless, some officers serving with the Joint Chiefs of Staff remain deeply concerned that the Administration will have a far more positive assessment of the air campaign than they should, the former senior intelligence official said. "There is no way that Rumsfeld and Cheney will draw the right conclusion about this," he said. "When the smoke clears, they'll say it was a success, and they'll draw reinforcement for their plan to attack Iran."
[cont at URL above]
Wrap...
[an excerpt from article]
http://www.truthout.org/docs_2006/081306Y.shtml
"... In the early discussions with American officials, I was told by the Middle East expert and the government consultant, the Israelis repeatedly pointed to the war in Kosovo as an example of what Israel would try to achieve. The NATO forces commanded by U.S. Army General Wesley Clark methodically bombed and strafed not only military targets but tunnels, bridges, and roads, in Kosovo and elsewhere in Serbia, for seventy-eight days before forcing Serbian forces to withdraw from Kosovo. "Israel studied the Kosovo war as its role model," the government consultant said. "The Israelis told Condi Rice, 'You did it in about seventy days, but we need half of that - thirty-five days.' "
There are, of course, vast differences between Lebanon and Kosovo. Clark, who retired from the military in 2000 and unsuccessfully ran as a Democrat for the Presidency in 2004, took issue with the analogy: "If it's true that the Israeli campaign is based on the American approach in Kosovo, then it missed the point. Ours was to use force to obtain a diplomatic objective - it was not about killing people." Clark noted in a 2001 book, "Waging Modern War," that it was the threat of a possible ground invasion as well as the bombing that forced the Serbs to end the war. He told me, "In my experience, air campaigns have to be backed, ultimately, by the will and capability to finish the job on the ground."
Kosovo has been cited publicly by Israeli officials and journalists since the war began. On August 6th, Prime Minister Olmert, responding to European condemnation of the deaths of Lebanese civilians, said, "Where do they get the right to preach to Israel? European countries attacked Kosovo and killed ten thousand civilians. Ten thousand! And none of these countries had to suffer before that from a single rocket. I'm not saying it was wrong to intervene in Kosovo. But please: don't preach to us about the treatment of civilians." (Human Rights Watch estimated the number of civilians killed in the NATO bombing to be five hundred; the Yugoslav government put the number between twelve hundred and five thousand.)
Cheney's office supported the Israeli plan, as did Elliott Abrams, a deputy national-security adviser, according to several former and current officials. (A spokesman for the N.S.C. denied that Abrams had done so.) They believed that Israel should move quickly in its air war against Hezbollah. A former intelligence officer said, "We told Israel, 'Look, if you guys have to go, we're behind you all the way. But we think it should be sooner rather than later - the longer you wait, the less time we have to evaluate and plan for Iran before Bush gets out of office.' "
Cheney's point, the former senior intelligence official said, was "What if the Israelis execute their part of this first, and it's really successful? It'd be great. We can learn what to do in Iran by watching what the Israelis do in Lebanon."
The Pentagon consultant told me that intelligence about Hezbollah and Iran is being mishandled by the White House the same way intelligence had been when, in 2002 and early 2003, the Administration was making the case that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. "The big complaint now in the intelligence community is that all of the important stuff is being sent directly to the top - at the insistence of the White House - and not being analyzed at all, or scarcely," he said. "It's an awful policy and violates all of the N.S.A.'s strictures, and if you complain about it you're out," he said. "Cheney had a strong hand in this."
The long-term Administration goal was to help set up a Sunni Arab coalition - including countries like Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt - that would join the United States and Europe to pressure the ruling Shiite mullahs in Iran. "But the thought behind that plan was that Israel would defeat Hezbollah, not lose to it," the consultant with close ties to Israel said. Some officials in Cheney's office and at the N.S.C. had become convinced, on the basis of private talks, that those nations would moderate their public criticism of Israel and blame Hezbollah for creating the crisis that led to war. Although they did so at first, they shifted their position in the wake of public protests in their countries about the Israeli bombing. The White House was clearly disappointed when, late last month, Prince Saud al-Faisal, the Saudi foreign minister, came to Washington and, at a meeting with Bush, called for the President to intervene immediately to end the war. The Washington Post reported that Washington had hoped to enlist moderate Arab states "in an effort to pressure Syria and Iran to rein in Hezbollah, but the Saudi move . . . seemed to cloud that initiative."
The surprising strength of Hezbollah's resistance, and its continuing ability to fire rockets into northern Israel in the face of the constant Israeli bombing, the Middle East expert told me, "is a massive setback for those in the White House who want to use force in Iran. And those who argue that the bombing will create internal dissent and revolt in Iran are also set back."
Nonetheless, some officers serving with the Joint Chiefs of Staff remain deeply concerned that the Administration will have a far more positive assessment of the air campaign than they should, the former senior intelligence official said. "There is no way that Rumsfeld and Cheney will draw the right conclusion about this," he said. "When the smoke clears, they'll say it was a success, and they'll draw reinforcement for their plan to attack Iran."
[cont at URL above]
Wrap...
Saturday, August 12, 2006
Israel vs Hizbollah...
http://noquarter.typepad.com
/my_weblog/2006/08/hezbollah_as_ro.html#more
Very very interesting analysis/conversation at the above site concerning the UN
cease fire that's supposed to go into effect at 5AM Monday morning.
Wrap...
/my_weblog/2006/08/hezbollah_as_ro.html#more
Very very interesting analysis/conversation at the above site concerning the UN
cease fire that's supposed to go into effect at 5AM Monday morning.
Wrap...
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